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PRIVACY?

From May 2006 until September 2007, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork research in the obstetrics clinic of Alpha Hospital, a large public hospital in Manhattan.1 After successfully integrating myself into the clinic, I
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston University. Ph.D., Columbia University Department of Anthropology; J.D., Columbia Law
School; B.A., Spelman College. I would like to thank Nicholas P. De Genova, Brinkley
Messick, Neni Panourgia, Kendall Thomas, Rayna Rapp, Kris Collins, and Linda McClain for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks are also owed to
Reneé Burgher for excellent research assistance. Finally, I thankfully acknowledge the
mothers and mothers-to-be who I encountered in the Alpha obstetrics clinic for sharing
their stories with me.
1
This research was made possible by a generous grant from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. For an extensive analysis of my research in and of
the Alpha obstetrics clinic, see KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter
BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE]; see also Khiara M. Bridges, Pregnancy, Medicaid, State
Regulation, and the Production of Unruly Bodies, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 62 (2008)
[hereinafter Bridges, Unruly Bodies] (exploring from a Foucauldian perspective the enrollment process of the New York State Prenatal Care Assistance Program, a Medicaid
program that covers the prenatal care expenses of indigent women); Khiara M. Bridges,
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participated in most aspects of its daily life—making my participant-observations from the waiting areas, the receptionists’ intake desk, the nurses’
triage rooms, the physicians’ and midwives’ examination rooms, and the offices of the many categories of professionals who provide medical care and
social services to Alpha patients.2 The overwhelming majority of pregnant
patients receiving prenatal care from the Alpha obstetrics clinic are poor,
and almost all rely upon Medicaid, specifically the Prenatal Care Assistance
Program (“PCAP”),3 to cover the costs of their prenatal healthcare expenses.
Prior to beginning PCAP-subsidized prenatal care at Alpha Hospital, pregnant women are compelled, by law, to be interviewed by a battery of professionals—including nurses, health educators, financial officers, HIVcounselors, and social workers.
I had the opportunity to sit in on a social worker’s consultation with an
African American woman, Erica, who was pregnant with her fourth child. I
had asked the social worker, Tina, an energetic, though overworked woman,
to ask Erica if I could sit in during her consultation. Erica consented and
allowed me to tape record her session. I quote her consultation at length:
Tina (“T”): Are you working?
Erica (“E”): No—I’m in college still.
T: How are you supporting yourself?
E: [long pause] How could I forget what it’s called . . . . Welfare!
[laughs]
T: You receive public assistance?
E: Yes.
T: How much?
E: Um, 354 . . . .
T: And does that include what they give you for your rent?
E: Yes. Well, I don’t pay rent.
T: You don’t pay rent?
Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the Reproductive Lives of Poor Black and Racially Subjugated Women, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 609 (2009) (analyzing the continuities and discontinuities between the obstetrics clinic at Alpha Hospital and the classic
colony); and Khiara M. Bridges, Wily Patients, Welfare Queens, and the Reiteration of
Race in the U.S., 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Bridges, Wily Patients]
(exploring the racialized meanings that attach to the receipt of state subsidized care in
Alpha Hospital).
2
I also compiled over 120 hours of in-depth interviews with patients, staff, providers,
and hospital administrators.
3
The Prenatal Care Assistance Program (“PCAP”) is a special program within the
New York State Medicaid program that provides comprehensive prenatal care services to
otherwise uninsured or underinsured women. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, PRENATAL CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (PCAP): MEDICAID POLICY GUIDELINES MANUAL (2007),
available at http://www.emedny.org/ProviderManuals/Prenatal/PDFS/Prenatal-Policy_
Section.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, PCAP POLICY MANUAL]. PCAP
is an extension of the Medicaid program insofar as it is available to undocumented immigrant women as well as women who earn up to 200% of the federal poverty level—two
categories of women who would otherwise be ineligible for Medicaid. Id. at 5. PCAP
coverage terminates eight weeks after the woman gives birth. Id.
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E: I live in a shelter.
T: What shelter do you live in?
E: Beta Houses.
T: Who’s your caseworker?
E: Ms. C.
T: Do you have the number?
E: Yeah—I have the number: 1-212-555-1212. She has an extension: 1212.
T: And how long have you been there?
E: Almost four months.
T: And can you tell me what the circumstances were that put you
in shelter?
E: Domestic violence.
T: And how long did the domestic violence last?
E: Two months.
T: So, you were in a domestic violence relationship for about two
months, and then you moved to a shelter.
E: Uh-huh.
T: And how long was your relationship?
E: It wasn’t really a relationship. It was, like, I would say—three
months.
T: I’m sorry?
E: Three months—it was, like, a three-month relationship.
T: It was a three-month relationship. And do you have a police
report and an order of protection?
E: The police report, yes. Not the order of protection—still didn’t
get it.
T: Would you like to talk to someone about the domestic violence?
E: No . . . .
T: Who’s the father of the baby?
E: Nathanial Thompson.
T: Is the father of the baby living with you?
E: No.
T: How long have you been in a relationship with the father?
E: 10 years.
T: The father of the baby?
E: Uh-huh. Same father as all the rest of them.
T: How old is he?
E: How old? 34.
T: Can you identify the father?
E: Yes . . . .
T: What’s his name?
E: Nathanial Thompson.
T: And how would you describe your relationship with the father?
E: Fine—now.
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T: “Fine now”?
E: Uh-huh.
T: Does he intend to help when the baby comes?
E: Yes—he’s my fiancé. I just didn’t get my ring yet. He better
hurry up.
T: Is he working?
E: Yes. No, he doesn’t work. Sorry. He’s in college.
T: How does he support himself?
E: I know that he’s on public assistance, but I don’t know what he
gets or anything like that.
T: But, he’s going to able to support you and your child?
E: Yes, he’s going to get a job by the time—he’s about to be done
with college.
T: You feel that when he’s done with school, he’s going to be financially able to support the child?
E: He’s going to be making 43,000 [dollars] a year.
T: You know that already?
E: Yes. His job is already set up.
T: What does he do?
E: He’s a computer technician. I don’t know how he does it. I hate
computers.
T: You are in a better situation than a lot of our patients.
E: I just have to get up out this dag-gone shelter. Then, I’ll be
fine.4
What is remarkable about this exchange is that Erica was led into a
conversation about a romantic relationship that tragically involved severe,
homelessness-inducing violence, the healthiness of her relationship with the
father of her children, her earnings capacity, the earnings capacity of the
father of her children, and any previous contact that she had had with the
welfare state (in addition to answering questions about her history, if any,
with tobacco and alcohol products, controlled substances, mental illness, and
a host of other issues that I have not included in this excerpted portion of the
interview) because she was pregnant and had presented herself to a public
hospital with the hope of receiving state-assisted prenatal care. It is important to observe at the outset that this is an intensely personal, painfully intimate conversation that privately-insured pregnant women can avoid
enduring.
I attempt to accomplish two goals in this Article. The first goal is to
argue that PCAP’s compelled consultations function as a gross and substantial intrusion by the government into poor, pregnant women’s private lives.5
4
Interview with Erica (July 3, 2007) (on file with author). I return to a discussion of
this particular interview with Erica infra Part IV.
5
This is an argument that I have made elsewhere. See generally Bridges, Unruly
Bodies, supra note 1.
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Indeed, the families that these women seek to create or expand are made
“public” inasmuch as the state insists upon expunging the highly-idealized
line that is thought to protect the “private family” from state involvement in
order to maintain a supervisory, regulatory, and occasionally punitive presence in poor women’s families. The second goal is to investigate why it is
that indigent women and families fail to enjoy a presumption of privacy with
regard to matters that have been imagined, within political and popular discourse, as private. Poor women’s and poor families’ “privacy,” if it was
valued, could prevent the state from accomplishing the wholesale occupation
of their lives. This Article attempts to arrive at an explanation for the public
nature of indigent women’s and families’ would-be private lives.
One prominent line of feminist thought, best exemplified in the work of
Martha Fineman, asserts that the private family becomes “public” whenever
the husband/father is absent.6 With respect to unmarried mothers who are
poor, the absence of the male figure makes visible the mother/caretaker’s
dependency insofar as she is compelled to call upon the state, rather than the
husband/father, for support.7 With respect to single mothers, specifically divorced mothers, who are not poor, Fineman observes that these women have
limitations placed on their physical movement absent the state or their exhusbands’ consent.8 She also argues that the “elusive and ill-defined ‘best
interest of the child’” standard that determines which parent will be granted
6
In her exposition on the failure of the right to privacy to protect the private lives of
some mothers from government intervention, Fineman explains:
[t]here is a presumption with constitutional dimensions that natural families have
a right to be free of state intervention and control . . . . These presumptions that
cushion traditional families are eroded when single mothers make similar or parallel demands. Single mother families fall outside of prevailing ideological constructs about what (or who) constitutes a complete or real family—they may be
thought of as “public” families, not entitled to privacy.
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 177–78 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, NEUTERED
MOTHER].
For Fineman, “public families” are families in which the father is absent; thus, the
“public family,” as Fineman defines it, is the family headed by an unmarried mother.
She notes, “the prevailing presumption for these families is that the absence of a father
creates a void, one that is appropriately filled by the state—by the bureaucrats who populate the many institutions, including legal ones, that deal with single mothers.” Id. at
178. The failure of the “public family” to conform to hegemonic constructions of the
heteronormative family—that is, the failure of the “public family” to consist of the
mother-father-child triad—results in its exposure to interference, surveillance, and regulation by the state. Id. at 177–80.
7
Id. at 161–66 (describing the “[i]nevitable and [d]erivative [d]ependencies” created by the fact that children, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled must be cared for by
someone, noting that “[t]he very process of assuming caretaking responsibilities creates
dependency in the caretaker—she needs some social structure to provide the means to
care for others,” and arguing that women are problematized when they have no wage
earner to support them and they must “ ‘go begging to the state’ ”). Id. at 161, 163, 165.
8
Id. at 178 (“Divorced mothers . . . are typically precluded from leaving the state
with their children without paternal or state consent. They can be threatened with the loss
of their children in modification proceedings post-divorce . . . .”).
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physical and legal custody of children subjects divorced mothers to suspicion, supervision, and punishment.9 The inclusion of non-poor families
within Fineman’s definition of the “public family” is an important move;
indeed, one of the primary components of Fineman’s intervention is to
demonstrate that families of all socioeconomic statuses are made “public”
whenever the male figure is not present.10 However, this powerful analysis
may miss the phenomenon that a family can still be “public” when a husband/father is present; this is so when the family must rely on certain public
services and forms of state assistance.
While many Alpha patients are single or do not otherwise have a husband/father present in their families, many other Alpha patients are, in fact,
married or within stable relationships with the fathers of their children. In
light of this, the argument that the absence of the male figure is the condition
of possibility for state intervention in women’s lives must be adapted somewhat: it is not the absence of the male that precipitates the dissolution of
Alpha patients’ privacy rights, but rather the receipt or intended receipt of
government aid. That is, it is poor women’s and families’ poverty that subjects them to the suspension of their rights to privacy.11 The critical insight
9

Id.
See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2197 (1995) [hereinafter Fineman, Masking Dependency]
(“What have [mothers on public assistance] done to ‘deserve’ such harsh words and
punitive measures? In large part it is the stigma of being poor. But more than poverty is
at issue. The broad general target is unmarried women with children, and the attacks on
these mothers are the opening salvo of a reactionary plan to discipline women who do not
conform to the roles they are assigned within the traditional scheme of the family.”)
(footnote omitted).
11
Other scholars have focused on class as a crucial factor animating the delivery of
social services and the construction of family law, more generally. See, e.g., Barbara J.
Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen’s Compensation and
Mothers’ Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123, 133, 145 (Linda Gordon ed.,
1990) (comparing the development of welfare programs that were designed to benefit
male wage workers (i.e., Worker’s Compensation) with welfare programs that were designed to benefit impoverished females (i.e., Mother’s Aid) and demonstrating that while
the former program was “judicial, public, and routinized in origin,” the latter “was characterized by “moralistic, diffuse decision criteria” and was “cumbersome and repeatedly
intrusive”); Jean Koh Peters, Three Systems of Family Law: A Preliminary Historical
Investigation, in REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL
AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 545 app. at 546 (3d ed. 2007) (identifying three systems of
family law, which include one designed for “non-poor white people,” which primarily
functioned to protect family wealth; one designed for “poor white families,” which was
highly interventionist and frequently removed “children from their homes based primarily on family poverty”; and one designed for “black slaves,” who “were not allowed to
form as families in the eyes of the law”) (emphasis omitted); Jill Elaine Hasday,
Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90
GEO. L.J. 299, 357 (2002) (“The law of parenthood, as it is authoritatively understood,
remains deferential to parental judgment and strongly predisposed against intervention.
But it continues to be the case that the law takes the provision of financial support
through certain government programs associated with failed fatherhood and dependency
as grounds for subjecting entire families to rules and norms that are interventionist, instrumental, and wholly at odds with those conventionally identified with the law of parental relations.”); Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
10
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offered by the present analysis is that the reliance on the welfare state (for
medical services or otherwise) makes “public” even the family that has
managed to fulfill heteronormative ideals. Thus, the “public family,” as I
use the term, is understood as a family that receives public assistance in the
form of Medicaid and whose receipt of public assistance makes possible the
violation or disappearance of privacy and parental rights that was insightfully observed and powerfully criticized by Fineman.
The apparent evanescence by legal fiat of poor women’s privacy rights
in the Alpha obstetrics clinic allows for an entry into an examination of the
right to privacy, more generally. What is the nature of the present right to
privacy? Is the right to privacy possessed by poor women in “public families” the same as that possessed by non-poor women? Is it accurate to even
call that which is possessed by poor women in “public families” a privacy
right?
It ought to be noted at the outset that the language of “privacy” has
fallen out of favor in recent years. While jurists invoked “privacy” —and
the right to it—throughout the series of cases that articulated the constitutional status of the state’s obligation of noninterference in individuals’ and
families’ lives with regard to matters pertaining to the family, sex, and procreation,12 the Court more recently has shifted to the language of “liberty”
when speaking of the same matters.13 Moreover, even during its heyday as a
jurisprudential concept, “privacy,” as the basis upon which to base a fundaDevelopment, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257–58 (1963–64) (describing
California’s private and public system of family law, the former being “civil, nonpolitical, and less penal” and the latter being “heavily political and measurably penal”). The
present Article examines the phenomenon observed by these scholars in the context of
the delivery of medical services.
12
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (noting that while “[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy[,] . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution” and holding that the right of privacy protects a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(holding that the state was prohibited from banning the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons and arguing that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the state
was prohibited from banning the sale of contraceptives to married persons and arguing
that the Court was “deal[ing] with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”).
13
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that “[t]he liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to” express their sexuality via “intimate conduct with another person”) (emphasis added); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857, 869 (1992) (noting “the scope of recognized protection
accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about
whether to beget or bear a child” and arguing that “it follows that it is a constitutional
liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy”) (emphasis
added). Indeed, the dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Court upheld a federal
ban on a specific method of performing second and third trimester abortions, appeared to
renounce the utility of the rhetoric of privacy when articulating what is at stake in the
right to an abortion: “[t]hus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a
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mental right, had many detractors—including among them liberals and radicals who otherwise may have been supportive of the liberties and/or
activities protected by the privacy right.14
However, “privacy” may continue to be a valuable concept. For example, some scholars have argued that privacy, despite its limitations, is foundational to the creation of moral personhood and identity.15 Linda McClain,
for one, has explored privacy as the condition of possibility for the cultivation of the self.16 She writes that “privacy affords . . . the literal and metaphorical space or opportunity for self-development or self-constitution, as
well as for revision of the self.”17 These “goods of privacy,” for McClain,
sustain the concept against its detractors—critics who blame it for both the
underparticipation of women in society as well as for the government’s refusal to act affirmatively to help individuals pursue the good life.18
woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
14
See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the
Role of Law, in POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328, 331–35 (David Kairys
ed., 3d ed. 1998) (arguing that state noninterference in the “private” sphere facilitates the
subordination of women); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (criticizing the right to privacy as a foundation for
reproductive rights and arguing that it obfuscates the violence and disenfranchisement
that makes motherhood a status to be avoided for many women); Reva B. Siegel, ‘The
Rule of Love’: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2158,
2161–70, 2200–05 (1996) (documenting how “privacy talk was deployed in the domestic
violence context to enforce and preserve authority relations between man and wife” and
noting similar discourses of privacy in interspousal tort immunity laws and in the controversy surrounding the civil remedies available under the Violence Against Women Act).
15
See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 755 (1999);
see generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988) [hereinafter ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS] (examining the moral, philosophical, and
legal implications of privacy-related issues for American women).
16
See Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of
Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 772 (1999) [hereinafter McClain, Reconstructive
Tasks]; see generally Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, The Sanctuary, and The Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUM. 195 (1995) (examining the imagery from
privacy jurisprudence and its implications for theories of women’s personhood).
17
McClain, Reconstructive Tasks, supra note 16, at 772.
18
Id. at 762. For other defenses of the concept of privacy, see Annette Ruth Appell,
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 759
(2001) [hereinafter Appell, Virtual Mothers] (arguing that critics of privacy take it for
granted, “overlooking the fact that many families are already very public and struggle
against state oversight and control that is often uninvited and unhelpful” and noting that
“[t]hese families are more public because they are poor or otherwise do not meet dominant norms—norms that frequently privilege White, middle class, married, and heterosexual persons”); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the
Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 324–25 (2010)
(noting a correlation between the Court’s rejection of the language of “privacy” when
speaking about women’s right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy and its recent practice
of upholding abortion regulations, such as ultrasound viewing laws, that burden the woman’s abortion decision without directly preventing the abortion altogether); Naomi R.
Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1999) (arguing that
“family privacy” continues to be a valid concept); Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 18–19 (2008) (“[I]t is not clear that reproductive rights can be defended without some conception of privacy. Privacy allows women
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Moreover, the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, striking down a
Texas law that criminalized same-sex sodomy, suggests that the rhetoric of
privacy has not been retired to the jurisprudential graveyard, but rather persists as a useful way of describing the locations where the government ought
not to tread and the activities that it ought not to regulate.19 While the majority opinion does not ground its decision to strike down the Texas sodomy
law at issue in a “right to privacy” 20—indeed, the Court only mentions the
“right to privacy” or the “right of privacy” when it looks to Griswold and
Eisenstadt for their precedential value21—the language of privacy is nevertheless abundant in the opinion.22
Finally, while the “right to privacy” has been used to describe individuals’ and families’ interests in being free from government intervention in
matters pertaining to the family, sex, and procreation, it is also used to refer
to individuals’ interest in keeping certain information to themselves—even
when the information does not necessarily pertain to the family, sex, and
procreation.23 The language of “informational privacy” has not fallen out of
favor in the way that “privacy” has fallen out of favor when it is used in
reference to state noninterference in matters relating to family, sex, and procreation, etc.24 As will be described in Part IV, the right to privacy of poor,
pregnant women seeking PCAP-subsidized prenatal care is abridged not
only in the sense that the government intervenes in matters pertaining to
their families, but also in the sense that they lose the ability to keep certain
private information to themselves. Accordingly, the “right to privacy” is
doubly implicated by the interventions mandated by the PCAP mechanism,
making it even more appropriate to speak about the invasions produced by
space to reflect and deliberate on moral choices.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1424, 1462–81 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts] (arguing that the feminist critique of privacy does not speak from the perspective
of poor women of color and delineating how privacy doctrine could be used to produce
and protect reproductive freedom for marginalized women).
19
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
to sex.”).
20
The Court based its decision to strike down the law on its determination that the
law violated gay persons’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 578.
21
Id. at 564–65.
22
See, e.g., id. at 567 (noting that the regulation at issue touches upon “private
human conduct . . . in the most private of places”); id. at 569–70 (observing that the
“private acts” prohibited by the statute occur “in private” due to “the very private nature
of the conduct”); id. at 578 (concluding that persons affected by the statute “are entitled
to respect for their private lives” and arguing that “[t]he State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime”).
23
See Gilman, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that “[i]nformational privacy concerns the
interest individuals have in controlling their personal data and limiting access to such
information by others” and arguing that the receipt of government assistance in the form
of TANF limits poor women’s informational privacy).
24
See id. at 1 (noting that due to recent developments in the form of anti-terrorism
efforts, health care reform, and “internet consumerism,” privacy—in the form of informational privacy—has been a hot topic).
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the PCAP apparatus as violations of poor women’s and poor families’ right to
privacy.
The intent of this Article is not to argue that privacy is a useful vocabulary—normatively or descriptively—for all women. However, for the
marginalized, indigent women who must turn to the state for assistance if
they are to achieve healthy pregnancies and infants, privacy is a concept of
great significance; indeed, the devastating absence of privacy may be that
which distinguishes their experiences with the state from their monied counterparts. As Dorothy Roberts instructively observes, privacy, when
respected, stands as an important limitation on state power—preventing a
totalitarian occupation of individuals’ lives.25 This demarcation of legitimate
and illegitimate spaces for governmental power is especially important for
poor women and women of color, the “private spheres” of whom the state
(and, during chattel slavery, other private individuals) has treated as legitimate sites of regulation.26 Because of the vulnerability that poor women
experience as a direct result of the lack of privacy, I, too, am unwilling to
“toss out the baby . . . with the bathwater.”27 This Article, then, explores
poor mothers’ and families’ experiences without privacy—whether it is understood as a freestanding right or, alternatively, a subset of a liberty
interest.
The exploration proceeds as follows: Part I gives a detailed description
of the requirements that poor, pregnant women must satisfy and the information that they must share in order to enroll in New York State’s Prenatal Care
Assistance Program and to receive state subsidized prenatal health care. A
25
See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 18, at 1469–71 (contending that
privacy is a useful concept for defending the reproductive rights of poor women of color).
26
See id. at 1470–71 (“Women of color . . . often experience the family as the site of
solace and resistance against racial oppression. For many women of color, the immediate
concern in the area of reproductive rights is not abuse in the private sphere, but abuse of
government power.”); see also Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 765–79 (arguing that poor families of color can benefit from more, not less, privacy); Cahn, supra note
18, at 1240 (noting the “importance of privacy to poor families, who are generally subject to intrusive governmental intervention”); Gilman, supra note 18, at 20 (observing
that, recently, the state has moved to privatize poverty while simultaneously denying poor
women privacy); McClain, Reconstructive Tasks, supra note 16, at 770–71 (arguing that
privacy provides the stuff that distinguishes experiences of freedom from experiences of
unfreedom and noting that while experiences of unfreedom—specifically, in its iteration
as chattel slavery in the U.S.—are marked by the pornographic display of bodies, rape,
forced reproduction, and the like, privacy provides seclusion, restricted access, and
secrecy).
27
ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 15, at 71 (remaining committed to the concept
of privacy). However, I, too, believe that a more robust conception of privacy—that is,
privacy understood as an affirmative duty of government—would better protect poor women and women of color than would privacy understood as a negative right. See Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 18, at 1479 (arguing in favor of a revamped conception of privacy that “includes not only the negative proscription against government coercion, but also the affirmative duty of government to protect the individual’s personhood
from degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination” and
clarifying that “[t]his approach shifts the focus of privacy theory from state nonintervention to an affirmative guarantee of personhood and autonomy”).
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brief overview of other state Medicaid laws with similar requirements is also
given. This Part argues that poor, pregnant women’s privacy is violated
when they are forced to divulge intimate details about their lives—details
that far exceed the purview of their medical care. Part II continues with a
brief history of the right to privacy, tracing its history as a right that protected the family entity from state interference to a right that protected the
individual from state power. This Part makes the argument that while the
right to privacy, in its contemporary form, is properly understood as an individual-inhering right or liberty, specters of its entity-inhering past nevertheless endure. That is, entity privacy may continue to be a relevant concept in
modern family law.
Part III then poses the question: if entity privacy is not a mere anachronism, but rather remains a functional, effective concept and practice, how
does one explain the violation of poor families’ entity privacy that is required
by PCAP and other similar Medicaid laws? This Part argues that entity privacy fails to protect poor families from state intervention, interference, and
regulation not because they fail to conform to heteronormative constructions
of the family; indeed, many poor families consist of the mother-father-child
triad. Rather, entity privacy offers no protection to poor families because
wealth is the condition of possibility for the exercise and enjoyment of the
right. Moreover, if entity privacy is justified on the grounds that our liberal
democratic order depends upon families producing future citizens who, having not been standardized by the state, can stand in opposition to state
power, then poor families are thought not to be capable of producing competent citizens; indeed, the parents that helm these families have failed to exhibit one of the most valuable characteristics of the citizen within
capitalism—economic independence. State intervention in the family entity
is, therefore, justified.
Part IV continues the exploration by conceptualizing the invasion mandated by PCAP as one that is not a violation of poor families’ entity privacy,
but rather is a violation of the poor, pregnant woman’s individual right to
privacy. This Part observes that the state is justified in nullifying the rights
of the individual—specifically parental rights—when it acts to protect the
child. However, the individual women whose rights are nullified by the
PCAP mechanism have not demonstrated that their children need protecting;
indeed, the state knows nothing about the women as parents except that they
are or will be indigent parents. The assumption, then, is that parenting by
the poor will be poor parenting. This Part concludes that the failure to thrive
within capitalism is thought to index a moral and intellectual laxity that
could translate into parental neglect or abuse; this is a laxity, moreover, that
justifies the state’s preemptive nullification of individual rights in the purported service of child protection.
Part V explores the argument that the reason why the state may invade
the privacy of poor women and poor families is because they have bartered
away their right to privacy in exchange for a welfare benefit. This Part dis-
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putes that poor women and poor families enjoy a right to privacy that may
be given away. Instead, it argues that it may accord better with poor women’s and families’ actual experiences to describe them as never having a
right to privacy about which to speak. This is because rights within the
present economic system are always already premised on wealth. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. THE NEW YORK STATE PRENATAL CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
In the state of New York, uninsured pregnant women with incomes falling below 200% of the federal poverty line are eligible to enroll in PCAP, a
Medicaid program that pays the prenatal healthcare expenses of women who
qualify.28 While PCAP is a New York State Medicaid program, it differs
from standard New York State Medicaid insurance in terms of the duration
of coverage offered, as well as its eligibility requirements.29 A pregnant woman seeking PCAP coverage is “presumed eligible upon a preliminary
showing . . . that her household income falls below [the requisite] poverty
level”—much unlike standard Medicaid coverage, which requires that the
application be verified before coverage can begin.30 Further, while “Medicaid applicants are required to exhaust certain household resources for eligibility, . . . PCAP applicants need only satisfy the income requirement.”31
Moreover, in New York, undocumented immigrants are eligible for PCAP
coverage, although they remain ineligible for standard Medicaid coverage.32
The process of enrolling in PCAP is quite onerous. Women are, by
legislative mandate, obliged to divulge a broad swath of information about
their lives—what I call an “informational canvassing”—prior to even seeing
an obstetrician, nurse midwife, or registered nurse for the initial prenatal
examination.33 It is true that much of the information gathered as part of the
28

See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, PCAP POLICY MANUAL, supra note 3, at 5.
See id.
See Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 185 (N.Y. 1994).
31
Id.
32
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, DOCUMENTATION GUIDE, IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR
HEALTH COVERAGE IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2004), available at http://www.nyhealth.
gov/health_care/medicaid/publications/docs/gis/04ma003att1.pdf (stating that “undocumented pregnant women continue to be eligible for PCAP” although they are otherwise
ineligible for any treatment other than emergency medical services).
33
The public advocate for New York City described the requirement that women
submit to an informational canvassing prior to receiving an examination from a healthcare provider as a “barrier” to prenatal care. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. PUB. ADVOCATE,
HURDLES TO A HEALTHY BABY: PREGNANT WOMEN FACE BARRIERS TO PRENATAL CARE AT
CITY HEALTH CENTERS 13 (May 2007), available at http://publicadvocategotbaum.com/
pages/reports.html (select from “2007 Reports”). She writes:
Requiring multiple visits prior to the first prenatal care appointment not only delays entry into prenatal care for pregnant women but also may discourage women
already struggling to juggle the demands of work and/or childcare or overcome
other barriers to appropriate health care, such as immigration, language, or transportation issues, or stigmatized behavioral issues. While social workers, HIV
29
30
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PCAP enrollment process is information that one would expect all pregnant
women—privately-insured and publicly-insured alike—to share upon beginning prenatal care. However, much of the information gathered from PCAPinsured women is not quite typical (when the wealthier, privately-insured
woman is taken as the norm), being culled only from the woman whose
pregnancy intersects with her indigence and need for public assistance.
The informational canvassing of indigent women is a product of PCAP
providers’ statutory obligation to have women consult with a nurse, health
educator, HIV counselor, Medicaid financial officer, nutritionist, and social
worker.34 Below, I describe the nutritional risk assessment35 and the
psychosocial assessment36 in greater detail.
Before beginning that discussion, however, it is relevant to ask at the
outset whether the informational canvassing of indigent pregnant women is a
product of pregnant women’s indigence rather than a product of their pregnancy. Some scholars have argued that pregnancy itself invites outside intrusion and control into women’s lives.37 Are poor, pregnant women being
counselors, and nutritionists provide valuable services, meeting with them should
not be a precondition for prenatal care . . . .
Id.
34
I have described this canvassing, as well as women’s experiences with it, elsewhere. Bridges, Unruly Bodies, supra note 1, at 70–86. Interestingly, the informational
canvassing and concomitant invasion of privacy required during the PCAP enrollment
process parallels the invasions of privacy that poor women can expect upon the receipt of
welfare in the form of cash benefits. Gilman, supra note 18, at 2 (“[F]ormal welfare
requirements overlay routinized surveillance of poor women, who must comply with extreme verification requirements to establish eligibility, travel to scattered offices to procure needed approvals, reappear in person at welfare offices at regular intervals to prove
their ongoing eligibility and answer intrusive questions about their child rearing and intimate relationships.”).
35
The statute provides:
The PCAP provider shall establish and implement a program of nutrition screening and counseling which includes . . . individual risk assessment including
screening for specific nutritional risk conditions at the initial prenatal care visit
and continuing reassessment as needed; . . . [and] documentation of nutrition
assessment, risk status and nutrition care plan in the patient medical record . . . .
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 85.40(f)(1), (f)(3) (2009).
36
The statute provides: “A psychosocial assessment shall be conducted and shall
include: (1) screening for social, economic, psychological and emotional problems; and
(2) referral, as appropriate to the needs of the woman or fetus, to the local Department of
Social Services, community mental health resources, support groups or social/psychological specialists.” Id. § 85.40(h).
37
See, e.g., BARBARA DUDEN, DISEMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPECTIVES ON PREGNANCY
AND THE UNBORN 28 (Lee Hoinacki trans., Harvard University Press 1993) (1991) (“Prenatal care programs . . . transform [the pregnant woman’s] body into a field of operations
for technocratic and bureaucratic interventions.”); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S
LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 135 (2005) (“[T]he law of reproductive issues has implicitly centered on observing and controlling the pregnant woman and the fetus using evidence that
is available from the outside. The point of these interventions is to control the woman
through controlling the fetus.”); Paula A. Treichler, Feminism, Medicine, and the Meaning of Childbirth, in BODY/POLITICS: WOMEN AND THE DISCOURSES OF SCIENCE 113, 120
(Mary Jacobus et al. eds., 1990) (“The health of childbearing becomes a signal for the
health of the state . . . . Many decisions about pregnancy, childbirth, and maternity have
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asked intrusive questions because they are poor or because they are pregnant? Accordingly, it is instructive to compare the requirements imposed by
PCAP with the requirements imposed by private insurances to determine
whether the experiences of the pregnant poor with having to divulge intimate
details about their lives are qualitatively different from the experiences of
the pregnant non-poor. Such a comparison would be difficult to conduct,
however. To begin, most private insurances do not oblige obstetricians,
nurse practitioners, or midwives to conduct any particular examination or
provide any particular form of education or counseling.38 Rather, the question with most private insurances is whether they will cover the cost of a
service that the prenatal care provider deems necessary or advisable.39 As a
result, the inquiry turns to whether most private healthcare providers conduct
a form of “informational canvassing” that, although not mandated by law, is
nevertheless considered standard medical care. The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”), a non-profit organization comprised of physicians, is the leader in reporting standards of healthcare in the
OB/GYN specialty;40 accordingly, one could expect that many, if not most,
private prenatal care providers look to ACOG guidelines when providing
care.41 Moreover, while the guidelines suggest that providers impart “gentherefore been concerns of the state as well as of the childbearing woman and her family.”); see also Barbara Stark, Reproductive Rights and the Reproduction of Gender, in
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 345, 345–46 (Linda C.
McClain and Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009) (discussing several countries’ pro-natalist
and anti-natalist policies, which function to make a woman’s pregnancy a matter of state
concern and subject to state intervention).
38
See, e.g., Benefit Detail: Maternity Services, Blue Care Elect Preferred, Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Massachusetts (July 1, 2010) (on file with author) (stating in the “Covered
Services Description” that members are covered for the “[d]elivery of one or more than
one baby, including prenatal and postnatal medical care by a Physician or Nurse Midwife”). The policy does not oblige pregnant women to undergo any specific medical care
or informational canvassing pursuant to that medical care. The Benefit Detail does provide that “all members may take part in a program that provides support and education
for expectant mothers. Through this program, members receive outreach and education
that add to the care the member gets from her obstetrician or Nurse Midwife.” Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that the policy provides that members “may”—as
opposed to “must” or “shall”—receive “support and education for expectant mothers.”
Additionally, the policy provides coverage for a home visit subsequent to the birth of the
infant; the “visit may include: parent education; assistance and training in breast or bottle
feeding; and appropriate tests.” Id. (emphasis added). Again, the stress here is on the
use of the word “may.”
39
See, e.g., id. (providing that the insurance will cover the cost of more than one
home visit by a healthcare provider if “Blue Cross Blue Shield determines [additional
visits] are clinically necessary”).
40
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, http://www.
acog.org/from_home/ACOGFactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010) (noting that over
90% of OB/GYNs in the U.S. have an ACOG affiliation and stating that ACOG “keeps
its members informed about current medication standards and ACOG’s professional recommendations” through various publications).
41
GENETICS AND PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR GENETIC TESTING, 4 (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/Professional_Guide
lines_Meeting_Summarypdf (reporting the results of a survey that “found that ACOG’s
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eral patient education”42 to their patients, counsel them on “nutrition in
pregnancy,” 43 and provide “psychosocial services,”44 it is important to remember that these guidelines are just that—guidelines. Ultimately, the provider decides whether or not to provide care in accordance with them. On
this point, the guidelines note:
The guidelines should not be viewed as a body of rigid rules.
They are general and intended to be adapted to many different situations, taking into account the needs and resources particular to
the locality, the institution, or the type of practice. Variations and
innovations that improve the quality of patient care are to be encouraged rather than restricted. The purpose of these guidelines
will be well served if they provide a firm basis on which local
norms may be built.45
Consequently, the extent to which privately-insured women are asked
to undergo the intrusive informational counseling experienced, as a legal
mandate, by poor women relying upon Medicaid for prenatal care is an empirical question—the subject of further ethnography, perhaps. However, it
may be sufficient to note that individual medical practices likely vary quite
extensively; further, a privately-insured pregnant woman can simply find another provider if she encounters a physician, nurse practitioner, or midwife
who insists upon including the counseling and educational portions of the
ACOG guidelines as part of his or her practice. Publicly-insured women, if
they wish to receive healthcare at all, do not have this option.
A. Nutritional Risk Assessment
At Alpha Hospital, the nutritional risk assessment begins with the nutritionist asking the woman to recount her most recent four meals. As the
woman recounts in exacting detail what was eaten and in what amounts, the
nutritionist diligently documents the information in the medical chart. The
woman is then given a form with an itemized list of foods; she is asked to
circle the number of times per week or per day she eats each food item. If,
guidelines are a primary resource for OB/GYNs and that guidelines do dictate and change
practices”).
42
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS AND THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PERINATAL CARE 88–89 (6th ed. 2007).
“General patient education” includes topics such as the symptoms that should be reported to the physician, the cost to the patient of prenatal care, and the encouragement of
breastfeeding.
43
Id. at 89–92 (“Each pregnant woman should be provided with information about
balanced nutrition, as well as ideal caloric intake and weight gain.”).
44
Id. at 124–25 (noting that “[a] woman with ambivalent feelings about her pregnancy may benefit from additional support from the healthcare team” and suggesting that
“[p]hysicians . . . be aware of individuals and community agencies to which patients can
be referred for additional counseling and assistance when necessary”).
45
Id. at ii.
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after this process, the nutritionist determines that the woman is at “nutritional risk,” she checks a box labeled “inadequate/unusual dietary habits”
on the bottom of the form that the woman has completed.46 The “nutritional
risk assessment” concludes with the woman making a verbal commitment to
meeting the nutritional needs of herself and her fetus. The entire process
takes anywhere from fifteen minutes to half an hour, depending on the care
taken by the nutritionist as well as whether there is a need for interpreter
services.47
Information about one’s diet may not be “protected” information but
there is a strong argument to be made that it is fairly described as “private”
information. Indeed, divulging one’s nutritional successes and failures—the
“good” and the “bad” foods that we eat, the frequency at which we eat too
much (or not eat enough), etc.—may be experienced as the sharing of intimate knowledge about oneself. Moreover, the information might be considered intimate and private because very rarely are people required to share
their dietary habits with others, especially persons who are unfamiliar to
them and who may be situated in an antagonistic relationship to themselves.
The autonomy to keep this information to herself or to share with others is
denied to the poor, pregnant woman seeking PCAP coverage of her prenatal
care expenses, as she is required to give this private information about herself if she hopes to receive prenatal care with the assistance of the state.

46
If “inadequate/unusual dietary habits” are found, the woman is made eligible for
the Women, Infants and Children Program for Pregnant, Breastfeeding and Postpartum
Women (“WIC”). WIC is a federal program, administered by the New York State Department of Health, with the mission of “safeguard[ing] the health of low-income women, infants, and children up to age 5 who are at nutritional risk” by providing food
vouchers for foods that are high in the nutrients (like protein, calcium, iron, and vitamins
A and C) found lacking in the diets of poor women and their families. About WIC, FOOD
& NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/aboutwic/
default.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); see also FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., NUTRITION PROGRAM FACTS (2009), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/
WIC-Fact-Sheet.pdf; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS, tit. 10, § 85.40(f)(4) (2009) (stating
that the PCAP provider must, as part of its duty to provide “nutrition services” to its
patients, make “arrangements for services with funded nutrition programs available in the
community including provision for enrollment of all eligible women and infants in the
Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), at the initial
visit”). The WIC statute provides that the program is only available to women who are at
“nutritional risk.” 7 C.F.R. § 246.7(e) (2006) (stating that a determination of “nutritional risk . . . may be based on referral data submitted by a competent authority”).
Accordingly, if the woman is interested in receiving WIC vouchers, it is to her benefit
that the nutritionist deems her diet “inadequate/unusual.”
47
One of the most remarkable things about Alpha Hospital is the vast diversity that
characterizes the patients who receive their care there. As a result, the hospital has in
place a highly effective system for providing to healthcare workers and their patients
interpreter services in a wealth of languages—from common languages like Spanish,
Urdu, and Cantonese to more unexpected languages like Zapotec, spoken by groups of
Indians in Mexico. When interpreter services are required, the length of consultations
tends to double.
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B. Psychosocial Assessment
During the “psychosocial assessment,” a social worker screens the patient for several “risk factors,” including: the unplanned-ness and/or unwanted-ness of the current pregnancy; the woman’s intention to give up the
infant for adoption or to surrender the infant to foster care; an HIV-positive
status; a history of substance abuse; a lack of familial or environmental support; marital or family problems; a history of domestic violence, sexual
abuse, or depression; mental disability; a lack of social welfare benefits; a
history of contact with the Administration for Children’s Services (the bureau responsible for investigating charges of child abuse and neglect); a history of psychiatric treatment or emotional disturbance; and a history of
homelessness.48 If a woman admits to the presence of a “risk factor,” the
social worker gathers more information about it with the goal of putting the
woman in contact with additional professionals who may be able to assist
her.
Expectedly, the interview with a social worker can be quite invasive, as
the social worker asks the patient a series of intimate, private questions in
order to discover the presence of a “risk factor” and, if found, to ask a series
of more intimate, private questions. Tina, one of two social workers who
worked in the Alpha obstetrics clinic, helpfully itemized the questions that
she asks the pregnant women that she encounters in the clinic as part of the
“psychosocial assessment”:
Was this pregnancy wanted and do you want to have this baby? Do
you have any experience? . . . If you’re a first-time mom, do you
have anybody who can teach you how to take care of a baby? Is
the father involved? Do you have a place to live? Money to buy
things for the baby? A social support system? Do you have anything in your history that might make the parenting difficult?
There might be things that surface for you at a time when you need
to be at your best for your baby. Is there any child abuse, sexual
abuse, domestic violence? . . . Is there any substance abuse? Does
she consider it a problem? Is she in a program? Has she been
arrested? Has she ever had any children taken away from her—
which means that she has a history of poor parenting? Are you
breastfeeding, bottle-feeding? Did you apply for WIC?49 . . . After
you deliver this child and are taking care of a newborn, do you
plan on having another baby right away? If you’re not, it’s easier
to not [become pregnant again] if you [choose a contraceptive
that you could leave in place for long periods of time]. Do you
know what options are out there? Are you going to breastfeed? If
48
49

Alpha Hospital Psychosocial Screening Form (on file with author).
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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you are, there are [contraceptives] that are better while you’re
breastfeeding. Do you have everything that you’re going to need
to know? Do you want parenting classes? Yes—you can go here
for them. Do you have everything that you’re going to need for the
baby? No—try going to this place. Maybe they can help you.
You have to be in the best condition that you can be in for your
baby. So, maybe you should get counseling. Here are some
places that you can go . . . . Do you want to kill yourself? If so,
come with me.50
It should also be noted that, even when the woman does not have a
“risk factor,” she leaves the interview with the social worker having answered a universe of intimate questions about herself—much of it prosaic,
much of it private.
C. Additional Required Consultations
The nutritional risk assessment and the psychosocial assessment are
conducted alongside several other consultations—including those with a
Medicaid financial officer51 and a nurse/health educator.52
1. Medicaid Financial Officer
During this interview, women are obliged to share financial information
about themselves. This interview can be experienced by women as obliging
them to confess facts that are deeply personal to them. Due to the necessity
of having to prove their incomes, these women—who, because of their precarious economic and structural position, exist as a vulnerable and exploitable labor force—are frequently compelled to confess that they or their
partners have worked “off the books” or have engaged in criminalized activities in order to support themselves.
Moreover, women frequently find themselves in the position of having
to confess their immigration statuses during this interview. A woman’s immigration status is made relevant during this interview because she is required to prove her identity.53 Proof of identity may be established by a state
driver’s license or ID card, birth certificate, United States or foreign pass-

50

Interview with Tina (Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with author)
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 85.40(b)(2) (2009) (“Following the determination of a pregnant woman’s presumptive eligibility for Medicaid benefits, the PCAP
provider shall act as a pregnant woman’s authorized representative in the completion of
the Medicaid application process if the woman provides consent for such action.”).
52
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 85.40(g) (2009) (“Health and childbirth
education services . . . shall be provided by professional staff . . . and shall include . . .
family planning.”).
53
Alpha Hospital, “Frequently Asked Questions about Applying for PCAP” (on file
with author).
51
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port, or a permanent resident alien card.54 That the woman is residing in the
country “illegally” is usually admitted when the woman, faced with her lack
of “official” documentation in the form of a driver’s license or state ID card,
asks how she will be able to establish her identity for the purposes of the
Medicaid enrollment process. It is an understatement of the highest degree
to describe this as a frightening admission for women, pregnant or not, who
are residing in the country without documentation.
2 Nurse/Health Educators
During this interview, women receive an “education” about their contraceptive options; moreover, this is an education that continues every trimester until the woman gives birth, and then once again during her
postpartum visit.55 In addition to obliging a woman to hear about her contraceptive “options” at least three times while she is pregnant and yet again
during the weeks following the birth of her infant, there is also an institutional practice of having nurses visit women in their postpartum recovery
rooms, mere days after the birth of their babies, to offer them the long-acting
Depo-Provera injection.56 Further, the childbirth education classes offered
within the hospital similarly place a strong emphasis on the importance of
electing and using a method of contraception.57 It is not unreasonable to
interpret the stress that the hospital places on contraceptives as a condemnation of patients’ future pregnancies and a censure of the present pregnancy
that has immediately brought them to the institution.58
The effect of the consultations with the nutritionist, social worker,
Medicaid financial officer, and nurse/health educator is that poor women’s
private lives are made available for state surveillance and problematization,
and they are exposed to the possibility of punitive state responses. Pursuant
to the PCAP mandate, private information about women’s immigration status, health status, and economic status is gathered and undoubtedly made
into objects of knowledge for citywide, statewide, and nationwide statistics;
their diets are quantified, problematized, and censured; and their histories
with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and any and all forms
of contact with the state—no matter how remote and seemingly irrelevant to
the woman—are made salient once again. Moreover, their fertility is condemned as they are repeatedly encouraged to begin considering the method
of contraception that they will use after giving birth, a repetition of “contra54

Id.
I have described elsewhere the institutional emphasis that is placed on encouraging
the pregnant patient to think about and elect a contraceptive method that she will use after
the birth of her baby. See Bridges, Wily Patients, supra note 1, at 34–44 (describing this
emphasis).
56
See id. at 32–33.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 43 (arguing that the present pregnancies of Alpha patients are implicitly
scorned as a result of the institution’s stress on containing the patients’ future fertility).
55
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ceptive education” that implicitly constructs the present pregnancy as an
event that never should have occurred. In essence, consequent to the PCAP
mechanism, a poor, pregnant woman’s right to privacy—that is, her right to
prevent the government from intruding into her personal, intimate affairs—
has been violated.
Moreover, this invasion of poor, pregnant women’s privacy facilitates
the enduring surveillance and regulation of poor families by the state. Subsequent to the PCAP enrollment process, the state has all the information
necessary to sweep poor families within the ambit of child protective services, the foster care system,59 Immigration and Customs Enforcement,60
and, if deemed necessary, the criminal justice system. Indeed, the invasion
of poor, pregnant women’s privacy that is mandated by the PCAP mechanism is surveillance. It is regulation. It is an intervention into the private
lives of poor women and their families—as the state, through “education,”
begins the process of forming women into the kind of parents that the state
thinks that they should be.
Finally, to add a bit of context, indigent pregnant women at Alpha experience these violations of privacy rights in an environment marked by a
hospital staff that tends to be hostile, belligerent, and antagonistic.61 Below,
I quote at length an interview that I had with an African American patient,
Cheryl, describing her experience with hostile staff and her reaction to it.
Like many patients, Cheryl had arrived at the hospital for her initial prenatal
care appointment with the expectation that she would receive a medical examination by a physician, midwife, or nurse practitioner. Instead, she was
informed that her appointment that day would consist of the informational
canvassing described above. She explains:
It began with the lady at the front desk. She was sucking her
teeth at me. And I was like, “You don’t need to suck your teeth at
me.” I said, “We need to speak about this calmly.” And she cut
me off and yelled “You were misinformed!”
I was really disappointed because I felt . . . . It is probably not
just Alpha . . . . I am used to a level of compassion and care that I
really found lacking here. I don’t understand why people work in
a hospital if you don’t care about the people that you are dealing
59
I could relate numerous stories about women losing custody of their infants once
born, as well as losing custody of their older children, subsequent to their contact with the
PCAP bureaucratic apparatus. For those stories, see generally BRIDGES, REPRODUCING
RACE, supra note 1.
60
Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the federal agency responsible for deporting persons residing in the country “illegally.” See ICE Enforcement and Removal
Operations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/
offices/enforcement-removal-operations/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
61
See Bridges, Wily Patients, supra note 1, at 4–12, 25–30 (describing several instances of staff antipathy toward patients and explaining this characteristic of the hospital
staff as the enactment of larger cultural and political discourses within which indigent
mothers are constructed as legitimate objects of contempt).
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with. Isn’t that a part of your job, and isn’t that part of the reason
why you became a nurse or OB/GYN or midwife? There was one
lady who took my blood. She was nice to me, and I cried. By the
time I saw her, I felt defeated. I was like, “Just take my blood. I
don’t really care what you do.” But, she was nice. And I was like,
“Why isn’t anyone else like you?”
I understand that this is a large hospital and they care for so
many minorities and different people all the time. I know the patients aren’t necessarily the smartest people in the world and don’t
have the best personalities . . . . I just felt like they don’t care . . . . I
even went to the Medicaid office to find a listing of different
places that I could go to, and they were like, “No, we don’t provide that information.” And I said, “How do you not provide that
information? You are Medicaid. You are supposed to.” And they
said, “No. We don’t; we never have; and we never will.”
I kind of feel stuck here . . . . The way that I’ve been treated
has been really surprising to me, and a part of me can’t wait for
this to be over so I can just take my baby home. I don’t want to
come back here and deal with these people.
I’ve been watching those baby shows on TV. [On one of
them,] there is this lady who had severe itching, and the doctor
said she had something with her liver and that it could cause complications in her delivery. So, I am, like, freaking out. I have
severe itching. When I get out of the shower, it feels like my legs
are like on fire. It is, like, really bad. So, the last time I was here a
few weeks ago, I went to ask [the midwife about it] real quick
before I was getting ready to leave . . . . The whole visit was real
quick—like, “Oh yeah, that is the baby’s heartbeat. Blah blah.”
And I was, like, “Hey, I have some dry skin . . . .” And she cut
me off and said, “Oh, you have to go to a dermatologist.” Not
even taking the time to hear what I am saying. I was just going to
say, “Yeah, I was watching TV, and I saw this lady, and I was just
wondering . . . .” I don’t feel like I need a dermatologist to check
me out. You are my midwife. You should be able to sit there
calmly and listen to me. She just kept looking at me like, “Damn,
I have to deal with this girl . . . .”62
Cheryl’s interview demonstrates, dramatically, that indigent women’s
privacy rights are not simply violated by the PCAP apparatus; but rather, not
infrequently, their rights are violated in an environment of disgust and
disregard.

62

Interview with Cheryl (Feb. 15, 2007) (on file with author)
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D. Other States
It is worth noting that the New York State PCAP program is not unique;
several other states’ Medicaid-funded prenatal care programs require pregnant women to submit to various non-medical assessments as a condition of
their receipt of state-subsidized healthcare. For example, California’s Comprehensive Perinatal Services Program provides “nutrition services,”63
“health education services,”64 and “psychosocial services”65 to pregnant, indigent women. Moreover, pregnant women must be “reassessed” every trimester during their pregnancy and once again postpartum.66 The statute also
specifies that indigent pregnant women should be referred to other services
that are not, by statute, part of the Comprehensive Perinatal Services Program—including WIC, family planning services, and genetic disease
counseling.67
In order for providers in Massachusetts to be reimbursed for the prenatal healthcare services that they provide an indigent woman under the state’s
Medicaid program, they must also provide a social work referral, if needed,68
as well as “health-care counseling,” which includes, among other topics,
instruction on “hygiene and nutrition during pregnancy” and “family
planning.”69
63
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 51348(c) (2010) (providing that women must have an
assessment of their nutritional health at their first prenatal care visit and subsequent reassessments every trimester, with the goal of “prevent[ing] and/or resol[ving] . . . nutrition problems” and “helping the patient understand the importance of . . . maintain[ing]
good nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”).
64
Id. § 51348(d). In exacting detail, the statute spells out on what bases women
should be evaluated during their “health education status” assessment:
current health practices; past experience with health care delivery systems; prior
experience with and knowledge about pregnancy, prenatal care, delivery, postpartum self-care, infant care, and safety; client’s expressed learning needs; formal
education and reading level; learning methods most effective for the client; educational needs related to diagnostic impressions, problems, and/or risk factors identified by staff; languages spoken and written; mental, emotional, or physical
disabilities that affect learning; mobility/residency; religious/cultural influences
that impact upon perinatal health; and client and family or support person’s motivation to participate in the educational plan.
Id.
65
Id. § 51348(e). Again, the statute spells out in exacting detail what should be
reviewed during the assessment of the patient’s “psychosocial status”: “current status
including social support system; personal adjustment to pregnancy; history of previous
pregnancies; patient’s goals for herself in this pregnancy; general emotional status and
history; wanted or unwanted pregnancy, acceptance of the pregnancy; substance use and
abuse; housing/household; education/employment; and financial/material resources.” Id.
§ 51348(e)(1)(A).
66
Id. § 51348(d).
67
Id. § 51348(j).
68
130 MASS. CODE REGS. 433.421(B)(4)(c) (2010).
69
Id. § 433.421(B)(5). Other topics that must be addressed during the “health-care
counseling” session include “smoking and substance abuse,” “care of breasts and plans
for infant feeding,” “obstetrical anesthesia and analgesia,” “the physiology of labor and
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Finally, Illinois has enacted a detailed statute that sets out an exhaustive
list of services that providers must give to indigent, pregnant women.70 In
addition to the expected nutritional assessment,71 a history must be taken of
the patient, during which the provider gathers information about her “social
and occupational . . . background, health habits, [and] previous
pregnancies.”72 Moreover, the patient must submit to “counseling,” which
addresses everything from “[p]hysical activity and exercise,” “[c]hild care
arrangements,” “[p]arenting skills, including meeting the physical, emotional and intellectual needs of the infant, with specific appraisal to detect
parents at risk of child abuse or neglect,” “[e]motional and social changes
occasioned by the birth of a child, including changes in marital and family
relationships, the special needs of the mother in the postpartum period, and
preparing the home for the arrival of the newborn,” “[d]iscussions regarding postpartum family planning options,” and “other relevant topics in response to patient concern.”73
II. A BRIEF HISTORY

OF THE

RIGHT

TO

PRIVACY74

The privacy right first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut75 was not
an individual-inhering right, but rather an entity-inhering one; that is, the
Griswold right to privacy protected the family as a unit from governmental
intervention and regulation.76 Moreover, it was only with later articulations
the delivery process, including detection of signs of early labor,” “plans for transportation to the hospital,” “plans for assistance in the home during the postpartum period,”
and “plans for pediatric care for the infant.” Id.
70
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 630.30(b) (2010).
71
Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(F).
72
Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(A).
73
Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(L).
74
The history of the right to privacy given here only touches on the right as it
protects individuals from government intervention in matters pertaining to the family,
sex, and procreation. While the right to informational privacy is also implicated by the
PCAP enrollment process, see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text, I have omitted
this history in the immediate account.
75
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76
Id. at 485–86 (describing the case as concerned with “a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy” and noting that the “right of privacy” that protects the marital
relationship “[is] older than the Bill of Rights”). The Court had long described the
heteronormative family as a unit that enjoys a constitutionally-protected right to be free
from state regulation. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(describing Meyer and Pierce as decisions that “respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)
(concluding that a state law requiring children to attend public schools infringed upon the
liberty of parents to direct their children’s education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1923) (striking down a law that prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages
in schools on the basis that the law interfered with parents’ rights to direct the education
of their children). Prince upheld a law prohibiting minors from selling merchandise in
public places—a regulation that functioned to interfere with the family insofar as it proscribed a parent’s ability to direct a child to work. 321 U.S. at 170. The Court based its
decision on the ability of the state, pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, to protect
minors. Id. at 166. Interestingly, the Court articulated the state’s expansive right of
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of the right, most notably in Eisenstadt v. Baird,77 that the right was transformed such that it inhered in the individual and functioned to protect private aspects of individuals’ lives from state intervention.
The privacy right’s history as entity privacy78 raises interesting questions when it is put into conversation with the “problem” of the “public
parens patriae—going on to use the doctrine to uphold an interference in the family
unit—in a case that arose out of a fact pattern that did not involve a heteronormative
family; Sarah Prince, the named plaintiff, was the aunt of the minor who was caught
selling magazines on a city street. Id. at 159. In an interesting article, Richard Storrow
argues that Prince was consistent with privacy jurisprudence because the jurisprudence
evidences a commitment to using the privacy right to protect traditional, nuclear family
units; because the minor was not Sarah Prince’s daughter, the Court refused to allow the
privacy right to protect their “family” from interference by the state. See Richard F.
Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families
in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 538–39 (2001).
77
405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts law prohibiting the sale
of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
78
Fineman identifies entity privacy as a common law concept—an outgrowth of
nineteenth century, liberal ideology that divided society into public and private spheres.
See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 6, at 186–87; Martha Albertson Fineman,
What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1999) [hereinafter
Fineman, Family Privacy] (“The idea of the entity of the family as something ‘private’
predates, and is analytically separate from, the constitutional idea of individual privacy,
although this ‘new’ arena of privacy seems rooted in older notions about family relations.”); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 39
(2006) (“Long before the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly named it a constitutionally protected individual right, states implicitly recognized and respected the concept of marital
and family privacy.”); cf. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp. 2d 153, 234 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (arguing that it is “beyond peradventure that the existence of a private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter has its source not in state law, but in . . . intrinsic
human rights”) (quoting Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Because the right attached to the family entity and not the individuals that composed the
family, and because the state/public sphere could not interfere in the private sphere, entity
privacy had the effect of rendering the less powerful individuals in the family—that is,
women and the children—without recourse to state/public protection. See Fineman,
Family Privacy, supra, at 1216; Hamilton, supra, at 39 (“State noninterference permitted
husbands to exercise authority over (and reflected their obligations towards) their wives,
children, and other household members.”). Fineman observes that entity privacy is
damning to women and children because they, “as individuals[,] . . . are undifferentiated,
and therefore invisible, within the family as an entity. The reluctance to look beyond
entity to individuals within the family has meant that they have been subject to potential
dominance and oppression.” Fineman, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 6, at 188.
Fineman notes that the concept of entity privacy has been critiqued by many feminists
because it “only operated as a mask for male oppression within families . . . .” Id. See
also Pamela Scheininger, Legal Separateness, Private Connectedness: An Impediment to
Gender Equality in the Family, 31 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 283, 304 (1998) (“[I]n
categorizing the marital unit and family as ‘private’ and insulating them from government
intervention, the courts have also protected that unit from judicial and state scrutiny of
patriarchal and sexist practices that harm women and children. Specifically, the state is
unwilling and unlikely to interfere with the family even if the intra-family practice involves violence against women and children.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark
Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1999) (critiquing entity
privacy because it is incongruent with state intervention in the family although abused or
neglected children may desperately require the intervention, and noting, more generally,
that “[w]hen we adopt a theoretical framework that endows any ‘unit’ of persons with
‘autonomy,’ or a ‘right’ to be free of state intervention, in practice, we are conferring
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family.” That is, within the right to privacy in its present, individual-inhering articulation,79 are specters of entity privacy nevertheless extant? If so,
are spectral entity privacy protections afforded to all families—including
“public families”? Moreover, does entity privacy offer a more effective avenue of protecting the privacy interests of poor women and their families
than does individual privacy? This inquiry can only properly begin with an
examination of the Griswold opinion.
A. From Griswold to Eisenstadt Through Casey, or From Entity Privacy
to Individual Privacy Through Individual Liberty
In Griswold, the Court found unconstitutional a Connecticut ordinance
that proscribed contraceptive use.80 The Court decided upon the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to married persons—although, as written,
the ordinance applied to both married and unmarried persons alike.81 Unaddressed within the text of the decision is the basis for the Court’s decision
that the marital status of the appellants’ clients carried such significance that
it could rule on the constitutionality of the statute only as it applied to married persons. Which is to say: the Court might have ruled on the ordinance’s
constitutionality as it applied to persons of the same racial identification/
ascription, socioeconomic status, age, or religious affiliation (or disaffiliation) as the appellants’ clients. Yet, it did not. Instead, it found only the
marital status of the clients constitutionally significant,82 thereby necessitatunregulated authority on the dominant member within this closed community of
persons”).
Entity privacy has had its fair share of supporters. See, e.g., Appell, Virtual Mothers,
supra note 18, at 686 (“Dismantling family privacy while leaving in place the larger
political scheme that permits autonomy-limiting income and power disparities will effectively target poor and non-dominant families who already must struggle to maintain their
integrity.”); Cahn, supra note 18, at 1243 (“Without some notion of family privacy, the
state can and will intervene . . . .”); Fineman, Family Privacy, supra, at 1223 (making an
argument in favor of entity privacy because of the needs of families, however configured,
for self-government). Communitarians have also advocated the return of entity privacy.
The charge is that individual-inhering privacy has worked to pit individual family members against other family members, therefore contributing to the decline of the family.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has most cogently articulated this argument. I will discuss
her work infra note 98.
79
Arguably, a right to privacy that protects individuals’ entitlement to be free from
state intervention in matters pertaining to family, sex, and procreation is no more—having been subsumed by, or transformed into, a liberty interest. For a discussion of this
possibility, see supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
80
The central statute provided: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). A separate statute
made it a crime for any person to aid or abet the commission of another crime. Id. Thus,
in concert, the statutes criminalized the activities of those who helped other persons obtain contraceptives, i.e., physicians and family planning advocates.
81
See id.
82
Id. at 486.
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ing Eisenstadt seven years later to definitively expand Griswold’s holding to
unmarried persons.83
The opinion in Griswold frames the law in question as one that “operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”84 It then takes a brief sojourn
through its previous holdings and finds that other unarticulated, yet extant
rights can be found in the shadowy penumbras of the Bill of Rights.85 The
exploration ends with the rhetorical question: “Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives?”86 Answering its own question, the Court states that
“[t]he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”87 The Court terminates its opinion by waxing philosophically and eloquently about the nature of marriage:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—
older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is the coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bi-lateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.88
This concluding paragraph of the decision serves to emphasize the centrality of the marital relation in this first articulation of the privacy right.89
Thus, it misrepresents Griswold to claim that the constitutionalized right to
privacy has always been about an individual’s bodily integrity, or that the
privacy right, since its first articulation, has been about an individual’s personal decisional autonomy.90 Bodily integrity and personal autonomy may
83

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
85
Id. at 482–85.
86
Id. at 485.
87
Id. at 485–86.
88
Id. at 486.
89
Also informing the Court’s decision in Griswold are “zonal” notions of privacy.
That is, the Court finds in the text of the Constitution recognition of the privacy that
should be given to the physical space, the zone, of the home. See Borgmann, supra note
18, at 293 (noting that the right of privacy, when first articulated, “had a distinctly spatial
sense”). The Court describes the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as protections “against
all government invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’ ”
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
However, the relevant home is not just any home; when understood in the context of the
Griswold Court’s initial framing of the constitutionally-suspect Connecticut law and the
final paragraph lauding the institution of marriage, we understand that the home spoken
of in the opinion is the heteronormative, marital home.
90
Justice Brennan appears to make such an assertion in Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). He argues that, while Griswold clearly appears to be
about the marital relationship, Eisenstadt and Roe “put Griswold in proper perspective.”
Id. at 687. Indeed, “Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State may not
84
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accurately describe what the right to privacy, and now a liberty interest locatable in the Due Process Clause, has come to protect.91 However, a faithful reading of Griswold demands the conclusion that the right to privacy was
really about the sanctity of the heterosexual marital relation and the protection from governmental intrusion that the Court believed should be afforded
to that unit.
The Griswold privacy right very closely corresponds to what has been
understood within liberalism as the “private sphere”92—that is, a purportedly “natural” and “prepolitical” arena into which the government cannot
intrude without violating supposedly “widely-held” notions of decency and
propriety. Within liberalism, state intervention in the private sphere is always and necessarily a restriction on liberty, as “the state should restrict
itself to formally guaranteeing the equal liberty of everyone to pursue in the
private sphere their particular conceptions of the good.”93 Subsequent to the
state’s successful guarantee of the formal equality of individuals, it becomes
illegitimate for that same state to interfere in the relationships and activities
that take place in the private sphere. This spatialized dichotomization of
society into private and public spheres appears to serve as the theoretical
underpinning of the privacy right as articulated in Griswold. Per Griswold,
prohibit a married couple’s use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.” Id.; see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 6 (2002) (“What was new in this jurisprudence was not the application of the concept of privacy to the marital relationship or to
the family construed as an entity. Rather, the innovation lay in the Court’s attempt to
articulate constitutional grounds for directly protecting the personal privacy and decisional autonomy of individuals in relation to ‘intimate’ personal concerns, whether these
arise within the family setting or outside it.”). Perhaps, in disregarding the relatively
unambiguous language of Griswold by contending that the decision ought not to be read
as articulating a privacy right that inhered in the marital unit, Justice Brennan and those
who would make this countertextual assertion feel that an admission that the right to
privacy has transformed over the years would open the Court to charges of judicial activism; that is, these countertextualists might suspect that permitting that the right has
evolved and experienced modifications in the decades since its first articulation would be
equivalent to admitting that the right to privacy has no anchor in the text of the Constitution—making the right even more susceptible to elimination in the age of political conservatism and originalist interpretations of the Constitution.
However, there is a compelling argument to be made that the right to privacy should be
retained because of what it has become. For example, Cohen argues that the right
“shield[s] the personal dimensions of one’s life from undue scrutiny or interference” and
therefore “protect[s] experimental, creative processes of personal identity formation.”
Id. at 51. Admitting that the right to privacy has become about individual decisional
autonomy and bodily integrity ought not to impugn the right’s defensibility. Indeed, the
right’s advocates might acknowledge the disunity that characterizes the right’s form from
Griswold to Eisenstadt, yet nevertheless argue for the persistence of the right based on
the significance of that which it has come to protect.
91
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857
(1992) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Roe, which found that there was a constitutional right to privacy that protected a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy, may be
seen “as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity”).
92
COHEN, supra note 90, at 3.
93
Id.
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the borders of the private sphere were coexistent with the four walls of the
marital home; further, the activities that historically and rightfully took place
there—i.e., procreation and the avoidance thereof—were not legitimately
subject to regulation by the public/state.94 As such, the Court in Griswold
took upon itself the duty of enforcing a separation between these two
spheres; that the public sphere would intrude into the private sphere to enforce a ban on activities that justly belonged there was “repulsive” to the
Justices rendering the decision.95 Therefore, it seems wholly accurate to describe the Griswold privacy right as a sphere-inhering right (that is, one inhering in the private sphere) or entity-inhering right (that is, one inhering in
the private sphere-residing family entity).
However, subsequent articulations of the right to privacy supposedly
sounded a death knell for privacy as an entity- or sphere-inhering right. Beginning with Eisenstadt, decided seven years after Griswold, and continuing
94
Counterpoised to this legal paradigm is a stance more amenable to state intervention in the private sphere. In this paradigm, it is acknowledged that the private sphere is
frequently the site of power inequalities, domination, and repression. Accordingly, “direct, substantive legal regulation in a domain once considered off-limits to state intrusion—the private family—is indispensable to justice between genders.” Id. at 2. Thus, it
appears that while the decision in Griswold is consistent with the liberal paradigm, its
progeny (i.e., Eisenstadt, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence), in their abandonment of the private/public sphere dichotomy, is more congruent with the latter legal paradigm.
95
It is worth noting that the private sphere protected by the Court in Griswold does
not fully correspond to liberal dichotomizations of society. Within liberalism, the private
sphere is comprised of the heteronormative family in addition to the economic market.
Thus, to the extent that Griswold recognizes a private sphere notably devoid of the economic market, its notion of such a sphere more closely corresponds to the patriarchal
private sphere recognized by feminists rather than traditional, liberal notions of the private sphere. See, e.g., Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in FEMINISM, THE
PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE 241 (Joan B. Landes ed., 1998). In her critique of traditional,
liberal dichotomies of society, Pateman writes that there exists:
a double separation of the private and public: the class division between civil
society and the state (between economic man and citizen, between private enterprise and the public power); and the patriarchal separation between the private
family and the public world of civil society/state. Moreover, the public character
of the sphere of civil society/state is constructed and gains its meaning through
what it excludes—the private association of the family.
Id. at 245.
Pateman argues that the traditional liberal formulation does not fully grasp the gender
politics of Western societies. Rather, the gendered division of these societies is better
ascertained by dichotomizing society into a public world of civil society/state versus a
private sphere of the family. Thus, Pateman would note that Griswold only recognizes a
division “between the private family and the public world of civil society/state”—what
Pateman identified as a patriarchal dichotomy of affairs. Id. at 245; see also Fineman,
Family Privacy, supra note 78, at 1207 (“Family is distinguished from both the market (a
chameleon institution, public vis-à-vis the family but ‘private’ vis-à-vis the state) and the
state (the quintessential public institution).”); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1501–02 (1983)
(noting that there are two dichotomies involved in the distinction between the “public
sphere” and the “private sphere”: “on the one hand, a dichotomy between the market,
considered public, and the family, considered private” and “on the other hand, a dichotomy between the state, considered public, and civil society, considered private”).
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through the succeeding re-articulations of the privacy right, the right has
been held to inhere no longer in the family entity, but instead in the autarkic,
atomistic individual. The facts of Eisenstadt differ from Griswold only insofar as the woman to whom the contraceptive was dispensed was unmarried.96
Thus, a new question of constitutional import was raised: Did unmarried
persons, like their married counterparts, enjoy a right to privacy that protected their use of contraceptives from state sanction? The Court answered
in the affirmative, holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the
state from discriminating between married and unmarried persons:
“[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be,
the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”97
Thus, the Court transformed the right of privacy articulated in Griswold
from something that concerned the heteronormative conjugal unit and the
boundaries of the marital home into something decidedly different; that is,
the right of privacy was made over into one that was possessed and enjoyed
by the individual.98 The Court explains itself at some length:
96

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 n.1 (1972).
Id. at 453.
98
Communitarians have critiqued the transformation of the right to privacy from one
that inheres in an entity to one that inheres in individuals. For example, Mary Ann Glendon argues that the Court made a grave error when it reinterpreted the right of privacy as
one possessed by an individual. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). She argues that it is because the privacy right
is individual-inhering that “poor, pregnant women . . . have their constitutional right to
privacy and little else. Meager social support for maternity and childraising, and the
absence of public funding for abortions in many jurisdictions, do in fact leave such women largely isolated in their privacy.” Id. at 65; cf. Woodhouse, supra note 78, at
1261–62 (advocating the replacement of the concept of privacy with dignity and arguing
that “[m]ost struggling mothers would trade a right to be left alone, which does little to
help them survive, for the right to be treated in a respectful manner, even as one accepts
government assistance”). However, there is a compelling argument to be made that it is
not because the right to privacy is an individual right that there is “meager social support
for maternity and childraising.” Nor is the construction of the right to privacy as an
individual-inhering right responsible for the fact that in many jurisdictions, there is no
public funding for abortions. In fact, there is no reason to believe that an entity- or
sphere-inhering privacy right would better protect indigent women, as Glendon seems to
suggest. Actually, it may be naive to suppose that an entity-based privacy right (for
which the middle-class, heteronormative family is the model) would protect the unmarried, low-income women that Glendon claims “have their constitutional right to privacy
and little else.” The problem is not juridical constructions of the bearer of the right to
privacy, but rather class. The problem lies with the verity that the state has not been
conceptualized as bearing a fundamental responsibility to protect the dispossessed and
disenfranchised.
The crux of Glendon’s critique of the individual-inhering privacy right is that an entityinhering privacy right better protects the integrity of the family, community, and nation
within which the individual is embedded and by which the individual is constituted. Yet,
this argument leads to the conclusion that the group (i.e., family, community, or nation)
would be the entity to make choices pertaining to a woman’s reproduction—a result that
may be terribly unjust and frightening. Thus, I agree with Cohen that, despite the fact
that all individuals are constituted by and embedded within groups, the privacy right must
nevertheless reside with the individual. She correctly notes that, even though individuals
may be accurately understood as group-constituted entities, this recognition does not:
97
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It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.99
In making an argument under the Equal Protection Clause to expand Griswold’s holding, Eisenstadt alters the base of the right to privacy to one that is
closer to (individual) decisional autonomy and (individual) bodily integrity—that is, the ability to decide what happens to one’s own body. Entity
privacy had been rejected; the right to privacy as an individual-inhering right
had been affirmed.100
obviate[ ] the need for privacy as decisional autonomy when it comes to certain
choices that the relational, embedded, interdependent, communicative individual
may have to make in modern societies. We do not initially choose the communities we are born or socialized into, or the strong evaluations and commitments
these generate; but surely as adults we must have the opportunity to affirm and
embrace some of these communities and commitments and abandon those which,
upon reflection, we cannot. Only if decisional autonomy in this sense is respected
in every person, however situated, only if the individual’s capacity for moral deliberation and justification, on the one side, and for ethical judgment and selfreflection . . . , on the other, are protected against coercion by the state or the
majority of the community, can the individual function as a moral agent at all.
COHEN, supra note 90, at 47. Indeed, a group-inhering right, without additional regulation of group politics, offers no protection against “state paternalism, whether in the
guise of community norms or majority will.” Id. at 48.
99
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
100
While abandoning the family entity and the marital relation as the crux of the right
to privacy, Eisenstadt might not have abandoned basing the right of privacy in a relation
altogether. That is, the Court might have recognized that contraceptives are only relevant
to individuals engaged in a sexual relationship with someone else. Thus, the Court might
have anchored the right in that relation of two persons—not a marital relation, but rather
a sexual relation. An alternative holding might have found that sexual intercourse between two persons conceivably created a different, yet equally legitimate, sphere of activity into which the state could only improperly intrude—an entity that the state could not
properly regulate. I should not be read as arguing in favor of the conceptualization of all
sexual relationships as constitutive of “families”; instead, I simply note that when the
parties involved in a sexual relationship so choose, an alternate Eisenstadt holding might
have made a constitutionally-protected variety of the “family” available to them. However, such a pronouncement would have been quite a radical holding, as the decision
might have compelled the acknowledgment and recognition of different types of “family”-like relations that comprise the private sphere. The “family” might no longer only
be constrained in such a way that it always and only coincides with its heteronormative,
patriarchal variety; instead, it would be able to be identified in various formations of
individuals—including formations that are comprised of individuals of the same sex.
Had the Court elected to democratize the notion of the family and maintained the right
to privacy as a right that inheres in a relation among two people, this form of “entity
privacy” need not have retained the problematic characteristics that “entity privacy” possessed when it rendered patriarchal violence and domination immune from state intervention. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Cohen suggests the same when she
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B. Privacy to Liberty
As noted in the Introduction, while the Court, since Eisenstadt, has reaffirmed constitutional protection for the activities once protected under the
rubric of the “right to privacy,” it has shied away from attaching the appellation of “privacy” to this interest.101 This resignifying of the right to privacy began in Casey, in which a plurality of the Court reaffirmed Roe v.
Wade102 by declaring that there exists a right to an abortion—albeit one that
was more limited than the abortion right first articulated nineteen years earlier.103 The Casey plurality declined to use the language of privacy when
describing the source of the abortion right, instead opting to use the language
of liberty.104 The plurality noted that there is a substantive component to the
Due Process Clause’s protection against deprivations of “life, liberty, and
property”;105 moreover, the plurality argued that the “liberty” protected by
the Due Process Clause was expansive enough to encompass the interests
and activities—including, most relevantly to the decision, a woman’s choice
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy—that had been protected previously
under the rubric of privacy.106 Thus, we witness in Casey the somewhat

advocates a notion of “relational privacy,” which would “cover what entity privacy covered without its patriarchal baggage.” COHEN, supra note 90, at 40–41. She observes,
“[o]ther family forms and other intimate relationships could all benefit from entity privacy—that is, from protection against unfair and unwarranted state regulations. Yet legal
regulation can provide a protective shield as well as a structure of justice for a range of
intimate relationships.” Id. at 40.
101
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
102
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103
Casey rejected Roe’s trimester framework and replaced it with the “undue burden
standard,” by which abortion regulations that burden, but do not unduly burden, a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy are constitutional. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
104
Id. at 844 (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after
our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in its
early stages, that definition of liberty is still questioned.”); see also Borgmann, supra
note 18, at 299 (observing that Casey may have “essentially abandoned privacy as a basis
for abortion rights in favor of liberty”); COHEN, supra note 90, at 63 (noting that the
Casey plurality “did not invoke a general right to privacy [but rather] a right to liberty”
and underscoring that “[l]iberty, not privacy, was the centerpiece of the plurality opinion”); Hamilton, supra note 78, at 63 (noting that the “concept of privacy itself may be
ceding ground to the broader notion of liberty (with its more explicit constitutional
grounding) as the justification for individual protections”).
105
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–50 (defending the doctrine of substantive due process and
arguing that the Court must discern that which is protected by the due process clause
through “reasoned judgment”).
106
Substantive due process protects “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.” Id. at 851 (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)). “These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id.
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subtle transformation of privacy to liberty,107 the consequences of which are
not entirely clear.108
Moreover, the Casey opinion reiterates that the right of privacy-cumliberty interest resides with the individual—not with a family entity, a
sphere, or heteronormative home. The plurality notes that there is “a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy”; yet, “[t]he woman’s liberty is not so unlimited”; therefore, before
viability, “the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy”;
indeed, “[t] he woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is
the most central principle of Roe v. Wade.” 109 Casey clearly pronounces that
the right to privacy/liberty interest is an individual-inhering one. As an individual right/interest, the extent of the activity protected by it must be limited
by others’ interests: “What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”110 It is
arguably because the right-holder is conceptualized as atomistic and individualized—that is, because the right/interest is possessed by the individual woman in her solitariness—that the Court was compelled to consider the right
of the individual exercising it against the interests of others.111
107
It should be noted that the Court in Lawrence v. Texas articulated an individual’s
interest in being free from state intervention in the more intimate aspects of his/her physical and emotional life—that is, his/her right to privacy—as a component of his/her liberty. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The Lawrence Court also notes that, “liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex.” Id. at 572; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“The woman’s constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to
decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature.”). Notably, the Court
in Lawrence looked to privacy jurisprudence when tracing the genealogy of the liberty
interest that was violated by the Texas statute. 539 U.S. at 564–66 (citing Pierce, Meyer,
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe). For a discussion of the language of privacy in the Lawrence opinion, see supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
108
Borgmann has suggested that the constitutionality of the recent spate of laws that
burden the abortion right by requiring biased counseling prior to the abortion procedure
may be due, in part, to the reframing of the right to abortion as an issue of “liberty” and
not one of “privacy.” See Borgmann, supra note 18, at 325 (“The cost of winning Casey
is that women have protection for the ultimate abortion decision, but almost no protected
zone of privacy in which to make that decision. Perhaps the right to abortion would
benefit from renewed attention to the more familiar sense of privacy—not just privacy as
an awkward and unsuitable synonym for equality, liberty, or autonomy . . . , but privacy
as a protected space within which a person can make these kinds of important moral
decisions without interference from the state.”).
109
Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–71 (emphasis added).
110
Id. at 877.
111
To this end, the Court in Casey was asked to determine the constitutionality of
spousal notification provisions in state abortion laws. The Pennsylvania abortion law at
issue provided that, “except in cases of medical emergency . . . no physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman without receiving a signed statement from the
woman that she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion.” Id. at
887. The Court struck down the regulation. Id. at 895. The question posed by the
spousal notification provision is interesting when one considers that the right to privacy,
as originally enunciated in Griswold, was derived from the heteronormative family and
the marital abode. The irony is in the fact that the right to privacy, which has its foundations in romantic notions of an ideal, healthy marital relation, was now being deployed to
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C. The Persistence of Entity Privacy
Although the liberty interest that protects that which was previously
protected by the right to privacy is clearly, in its more current expressions,
something that inheres in the individual, specters of its entity-inhering past
nevertheless endure. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,112 a plurality of the Court
used an entity-inhering variety of the privacy right to deny a father visitation
rights to his biological child.113 The child, Victoria—the paternity of whom
the biological father, Michael H., had established and with whom he had
begun a meaningful relationship—was conceived and born while her
mother, Carole, was married to another man, Gerald D.114 After Carole reconciled with Gerald D., the married couple sought to preclude Michael H.
from having any contact with or legal rights to Victoria.115 Justice Scalia,
writing for the plurality, held that Michael H. had no legal claim to his biological child, as the latter had been born within a marital relationship to
which he was not a part.116 The plurality held that it was improper for the
state to intervene in that marital relationship in order to permit or facilitate
the parental rights of an outside party.117 Spectres of entity privacy inform
the outcome and haunt the interstices of the opinion, as when Scalia poses
the question of whether the legal tradition in the U.S. historically has protected the relationship between an unmarried father and his child. Answering in the negative, he writes:
[Q]uite to the contrary, our traditions have protected the marital
family (Gerald, Carole, and the child they acknowledge to be
theirs) against the sort of claim Michael asserts . . . .
....

protect one individual in a far-from-ideal marital relation from the other. However, had a
similar question been posed under a Griswold-version of the privacy right—asking
whether a state could compel a woman to inform her husband about her intent to abort—
the regulation probably would have been found to violate the Constitution. That is, a
Court using Griswold-era definitions of privacy likely would have held that the ordinance
violated notions of entity privacy as well: insofar as the private, intimate sphere of the
family was a realm into which the public/state could not intrude under entity privacy,
state regulations encroaching into that sphere with the intent of regulating the interactions
between husband and wife might have been viewed as “repulsive” by the Justices deciding the case. A Court using a Griswold definition of privacy likely would have held that
it was unacceptable for the state to impose itself into the marital unit in order to mandate
such conjugal decision-making.
112
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
113
Dailey has offered a similar reading of the case, describing the decision as one in
which “the Justices appear to agree that constitutional liberty protects the family unit
from unjustified state intrusion.” Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just
Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 980 (1993) [hereinafter Dailey, Constitutional Privacy].
114
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113–14.
115
Id. at 115–16.
116
Id. at 125–27.
117
Id. at 124–27.
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. . . What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within,
and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has done
so.118
Spectral concerns with the marital relation and the deference that ought to be
shown to it are most apparent in the conclusion of the plurality opinion, in
which Scalia writes:
The primary rationale underlying [the California statute’s] limitation on those who may rebut the presumption of legitimacy is a
concern that allowing persons other than the husband or wife to do
so may undermine the integrity of the marital union. When the
husband or wife contests the legitimacy of their child, the stability
of the marriage has already been shaken. In contrast, allowing a
claim of illegitimacy to be pressed by the child—or, more accurately, by a court-appointed guardian ad litem—may well disrupt
an otherwise peaceful union.119
In the same way, Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, appears
also to have been visited by apparitions of entity privacy, encouraging her to
find the marital entity deserving of protection from state interference-quaenforceable parental rights held by an outside party:
[A]fter its rather shaky start, the marriage between Carole and
Gerald developed a stability that now provides Victoria with a loving and harmonious family home. In the circumstances of this
case, I find nothing fundamentally unfair about the exercise of a
judge’s discretion that, in the end, allows the mother to decide
whether her child’s best interests would be served by allowing the
natural father visitation privileges.120
This short excursus on the ghost of entity privacy, clearly present
within Michael H., should not be read as arguing that the right to privacycum-liberty interest no longer exists as an individual-inhering right. I am
not making the claim that individual privacy/liberty has been defeated in the
wake of entity privacy’s triumphant return. Instead, what I contend is that
the privacy right/liberty interest as an entity-inhering concept is not a mere
anachronism, relevant only inasmuch as it represents a stage in the history of
privacy jurisprudence that has long ago been superseded. Far from being
abandoned to the annals of antiquity, entity privacy is present—informing
privacy, equal protection, and liberty claims decades after it was thought to

118

Id. at 124, 127.
Id. at 131.
120
Id. at 135–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
119
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be deemed constitutionally antiquated.121 Entity privacy may be considered
germane when scholars and activists seek to ascertain the content of constitutional protections, even if opinions within privacy jurisprudence no longer
articulate it as dispositive. As such, entity privacy continues to inform judicial and non-judicial notions of the propriety of some state interventions and
the proper role of the state.122
If entity privacy is undestroyed and relevant, what does it mean that the
families of the pregnant seekers of prenatal care at Alpha Hospital can be
inquired into, subsequently problematized, and, if the “need” is discerned,
directly regulated by the state?123 If PCAP indeed functions as a violation of
poor families’ entity privacy, it is relevant to ask why there is no presumption of entity privacy within the Alpha obstetrics clinic.124 Why do not no121
Dailey has argued similarly, writing: “[T]he family as an independent institution
has not in fact withered out of constitutional existence, but is very much alive in privacy
doctrine.” Dailey, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 113, at 964. And again: “The interpreters of constitutional liberty have never withdrawn protection for the ‘sanctity’ of
family life. . . . In case after case involving constitutional privacy, the Court has emphasized that the family unit and familial relationships define the core of this fundamental
interest.” Id. at 979.
122
Fineman, for one, champions the return of entity privacy, in part because of her
belief that families that do not conform to the heteronormative ideal need protection from
state power. See Fineman, Family Privacy, supra note 78, at 1210–11 (advocating an
entity privacy that “could be drawn around caretaking or dependency units” and clarifying that this entity privacy “would not be a right to separation, secrecy, or seclusion, but
the right to autonomy or self-determination for the family even though it is firmly located
within a supportive and reciprocal state”).
123
In an insightful article, Radhika Rao argues that the right to privacy is not properly understood as a tool to protect a sole individual from state power; rather, it protects
an association of individuals from state power. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1103 (1998). She
describes the right as one of “relational privacy”: “Privacy is not a right attached to
isolated individuals; it nurtures social institutions, such as marriage and the family, that
mediate between the individual and the state.” Id. at 1078. However, Rao underscores
that this right of relational privacy ends when the individuals that comprise the relation
are in conflict; the privacy right only protects their activities when they are “allied
against the state.” Id. at 1099. If Rao’s description of the privacy right is correct, it
reveals an interesting assumption about the poor families that I have argued do not enjoy
a robust right to privacy. That is, if privacy as a limitation on state power is only available to associations of individuals who are not in conflict, then the fact that there are little
or no limitations on state power to intervene in poor families—i.e., they do not enjoy a
right to privacy that is respected—reveals that these families are presumed to be in conflict; they are imagined as presumptively conflicted. Thus, the state apprehends the members of poor families as already situated in antagonistic relationships to one another and
treats them accordingly.
Interestingly, Rao writes that “[w]henever two or more individuals are engaged in
intimate activities without oppression within the group and without external effects upon
others, they should receive shelter under the right of relational privacy.” Id. at 1105
(emphasis added). Perhaps the reason why poor families do not receive shelter via the
right of relational privacy is because they are imagined to have “external effects.” Perhaps the external effects that they are imagined to have are consequences of their economic dependence and the likelihood that they will raise future citizens who “suffer”
from a similar economic dependence. I explore this argument infra Part III.
124
Indeed, why also is there no presumption of individual privacy? I explore this
question infra Part IV.
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tions of entity privacy make inquiries into the intimate corners of families
seem like a “repulsive” enterprise? Why is “repulsion” not felt by the professionals who perform these inquiries several times per day on a daily basis? Why has not the coerced permeability of the boundaries surrounding
poor families generated protests that the endeavor is indecent, unseemly, and
indecorous? This lack may say less about the viability of entity privacy as a
legal and moral concept than it does about contemptuous perceptions of poor
families. That is, the absence of protest about the privacy violations enabled—indeed, required—by Medicaid does not demonstrate that entity privacy has been abandoned; instead, it demonstrates that poor families, when
they have been affronted or insulted, are not conceived of as entities worthy
of romantic philosophic waxing and defiled senses of decency.
III. ENTITY PRIVACY

AND

“PUBLIC FAMILIES”

To reach the conclusion presented above—that poor women’s families
are not apprehended as entities deserving of the romanticism conferred upon
the families of their non-poor counterparts—one can observe that traditional
notions of entity privacy were designed to protect “traditional” families.125
The insufficiency attributed to the poor families (such as those of Alpha
patients) derives from their presumed failure to conform to the “traditional”
family archetype, frequently consisting of the mother-child dyad as opposed
to the husband-wife-child triad.126 This argument would conclude with the
observation that the nonconformance of the families of Alpha patients to
ideals of the patriarchal heteronormative family results in their construction
as undeserving of state noninterference.127

125
See Cahn, supra note 18, at 1235 (noting that entity privacy, or marital privacy,
“narrowly” protects “traditional marital unit[s]”); Fineman, Family Privacy, supra note
78, at 1216 (noting that, historically, entity privacy only protected “family units that
conform to ideological conventions about appropriate form and function—intact nuclear
families”).
126
It may reveal that noninterference is not afforded to families as such, but rather to
men as the only properly entitled heads of patriarchal families. See Hamilton, supra note
78, at 61 (“Family privacy protected from undue state interference the individual rights of
the husband/father as the head and public representative of his family.”).
127
Dailey makes such an argument in her analysis of the family within privacy jurisprudence; she contends that when family formations fall short of emulating those arrangements that society and government are interested in promoting and protecting, they
do not receive the benefit of state noninterference. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy, supra
note 113, at 956. She writes:
From laws prohibiting divorce in the early years of the republic to contemporary
laws denying homosexuals the right to marry, the state has continually shaped and
promoted a particular vision of family life. Far from prohibiting state intervention
in a prepolitical social sphere, the ideal of family privacy expresses a particular
set of family values by protecting only those social relations that the state deems
worth protecting. The boundaries of family privacy are drawn by political choice
....
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A different route through which to reach a similar conclusion is to argue that the “entity” term within “entity privacy” contemplates the heteronormative family—that is, the husband-wife-child triad. Accordingly, the
argument would be that families helmed by unmarried women are not “families” within the ambit of “entity privacy” and, thus, enjoy neither a presumption nor actual experience of privacy. Olsen references this
construction of the family in her analysis of “the private family” within
liberal political theory; she notes that “[t]he notion of noninterference in the
family depends upon some shared conception of proper family roles . . . .”128
And that is the dilemma presented by families headed by unmarried women:
inasmuch as the parental roles within the heteronormative family are distributed across two (married) individuals, single mothers necessarily collapse
the distribution into a sole person. In such a collapse, the “propriety” of the
“proper family roles” is lost, and noninterference as a state policy loses its
justification. Alternatively, perhaps it is thought that the unmarried mother
does not assume the “family role” traditionally assumed by the husband/
father; instead of the distribution of “proper family roles” into a lone female
individual, perhaps what is presumed is abandonment of the “family role”
historically assumed by the husband. Confronted with the unfulfilled role of
the father, the state occupies the space. As such, state noninterference, and
privacy/liberty, becomes bad public policy.
Hodgson v. Minnesota,129 holding unconstitutional a statute that required an adolescent to notify both of her parents prior to receiving an abortion, exemplifies this concern with the familial roles that (two) parents
assume—the delineation of parental duties—when raising a child. Justice
Stevens’ majority opinion notes that “[t]he family may assign one parent to
guide the children’s education and the other to look after their health.”130
The opinion goes on to note that “[a] natural parent who has demonstrated
sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the
children free from undue state interference.”131 Reading these two propositions together suggests that the rejection of single-parent families as worthy
of entity privacy may, at least partially, be premised on the belief that unmarried women have not “demonstrated sufficient commitment to . . . her
children.”132 That is, if those who enjoy entity privacy and are free to raise
their children without state interference are those who have “demonstrated

Id. Because single parent families—especially those helmed by poor women of color—
are not a “social relation[ ] that the state deems worth protecting,” entity privacy is not
drawn in such a way that includes these families within its ambit. Id.
128
Olsen, supra note 95, at 1506.
129
497 U.S. 417 (1990).
130
Id. at 446.
131
Id. at 447; cf. Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 701–02 (“Parental rights
doctrine bestows the right to make these decisions on adults who have shown a prescribed level of commitment to the child . . . .”).
132
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 447.
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sufficient commitment to [their] children,”133 and the poor, pregnant single
woman appears to have no right to raise her children free of state interference, then perhaps she is perceived as not having demonstrated commitment
to her children—a commitment that her marriage to the father of her children might presumably evidence. One could argue that the marriage of the
mother is imbued with the power to index her commitment to her child; as
such, the failure or refusal to add a paternal, third term to the mother-child
dyad signals the absence of her allegiance to the second term in her “family”; the non-married status of the mother signals the absence of her commitment to provide her children with a (real) family. This deficiency of the
mother-child bond, demonstrated by the mother’s marital status, justifies the
exercise of the state police power within the deficient “family.” Or so the
argument goes.
However, this does not conclude the analysis because, as noted earlier,
the “public families” that I encountered in the Alpha obstetrics clinic were
not infrequently composed of the mother-father-child (or soon-to-be-child)
triad. That is to say, many of the families that I met did, indeed, conform to
notions of the heteronormative family. In spite of this, entity privacy was
universally denied to the families of all patients within the clinic—not just
single pregnant women or the families headed by single women—as all patients were required to submit to the informational canvassing by which they
enroll in PCAP. Consequently, the explanation for the non-presumption of
entity privacy in the Alpha obstetrics clinic does not follow the structure of
the families at hand, but rather the class of those families. That is, the obvious characteristic that all of the families seeking healthcare in the Alpha
obstetrics clinic share is not family structure, but poverty. Moreover, it is
the characteristic of poverty that destroys the assumptions that motivate
traditional notions of entity privacy.
A. Theorizing (and Justifying) Entity Privacy
But, what are those assumptions? Some scholars have argued that that
which is at stake in state noninterference with the family—explicitly, that
which is at risk every time the state intervenes in the family unit—is the
ability of the family to independently produce productive citizens into whose
hands the nation will ultimately fall.134 Parental authority, and the limitation
of state power in matters regarding the family, is necessary if children are to
133

Id.
See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 440 (2006)
[hereinafter Dailey, Developing Citizens] (“In a democratic republic, . . . it is the proper
role of parents rather than the State to ‘prepare’ children for citizenship. This understanding of children’s place in a democratic polity follows from the Justices’ views about the
vulnerability of children to state coercion and the important role that parental rights play
in shielding young children from state indoctrination.”). Appell understands this justification for state noninterference in family life as a species of “public family” theory. See
Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 707 (observing that public family theories
134
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grow up to one day participate freely in a free society.135 As Dailey
explains:
Family privacy protects a realm of parental authority that is not in
itself a sphere of negative liberty, but that is a means for the development of responsible citizens . . . .
....
Parental authority is not, of course, without limits. Yet those limits
are themselves set by reference to the public ends of family life.
Parental authority is exceeded when it threatens to impair the
child’s development into a responsible civic individual. The settled boundaries of parental authority inject a strong normative vision of the “good citizen” into family life . . . . It must be
exercised in the service of creating citizens equipped to participate
in a liberal democracy.136
If one transports Dailey’s line of reasoning to the poor women whose
interests in the privacy of their family entities are not respected within the
Alpha obstetrics clinic, one understands that these families are thought to be
incapable of producing desired and desirable future citizens; state intervention in these family entities, then, is required for the protection of liberal
democracy. Expressed differently, parental authority with regard to the development of future citizens is not deferred to when the parents do not inspire confidence.137 If the maintenance of the “liberal democratic order” is
at risk when the state intervenes in families deserving of entity privacy, then
the liberal democratic order is similarly at risk when the state fails to interjustify protecting families from state intervention because families prepare children for
citizenship in a democratic society).
135
See Dailey, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 113, at 957–58; see also Appell,
Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 708 (“[When the state does not interfere in families,]
[c]hildren then mature into adults who possess pluralistic values and the ability to think
critically because of their allegiance to family and community. This rearing function
enriches the government by creating citizens separate enough from the state to be capable
of exercising the power to govern.”).
136
Dailey, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 113, at 991–92. Mangold would concur: “Colonial fathers were charged with the proper upbringing of their children, responsible for educating and training them to be productive citizens of the community . . . .
Colonial laws allowed . . . intervention into the parent-child relationship to assure that
child rearing was appropriate for raising employable and moral children.” Susan Vivian
Mangold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and Empowerment for Domestic
Violence Victims and Older Children: Empowerment as Protection in the Foster Care
System, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 69, 81 (2001).
137
Rosenbury makes an interesting argument that entity privacy and parental authority are respected when the decisions that parents make are consistent with the state’s
views. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833,
889–90 (2007) (“The boundaries of family privacy are thus constructed not by respect for
parental prerogatives, but by the views of the states and courts . . . . When childrearing
conforms to those views, family privacy is respected. When childrearing challenges
those views, family privacy ends.”). One could argue that the denial of entity privacy as
a matter of course to poor families seeking PCAP coverage evidences a presumption that
the decisions made by poor families will be inconsistent with the state’s views.
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vene in those families undeserving of entity privacy—that is, poor families.
Moreover, it is the poverty of the families that warrants the denial of the
presumption that they will ultimately generate productive citizens.138
The unwillingness to defer to the families of poor, pregnant clients of
the Alpha obstetrics clinic may be interpreted as manifesting a hegemonic
discourse within which the failure to realize economic self-sufficiency justifies distrust, suspicion, and antipathy. The inability to thrive within capitalism—which, hegemonically, is understood as manifesting a lack of “American” values139—is such an anathema that, if and when those who have
demonstrated this failure decide to reproduce, they are perceived as not deserving of trust to produce desirable citizen-progeny; rather, the presumption
is that, absent state interference, they will likely produce children who will
mature into adults like themselves—“un-American,” economically dependent threats to the nation’s coffers, values, and future.140 Justice Stevens’
opinion in Hodgson ought to be reconsidered at this point—specifically his
statement that “a natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the children free
from undue state interference.”141 There is something suggestive about the
fact that an indigent “public family” that is wholly triumphant in its fulfill138
Interestingly, Dailey writes that severe poverty may threaten the ability of families
to develop the citizens that sustain a democratic republic. Dailey, Developing Citizens,
supra note 134, at 475–76 (“The kind of chronic, severe poverty experienced by families
. . . operates as a form of political disenfranchisement for this entire class of children.”).
She ultimately argues that, because of the threat that poverty poses to families’ ability to
develop citizens, it is imperative that the government support these families. Id. at
487–88 (noting the “important constitutional interest in helping families to succeed in
their constitutionally defined caregiving duties”). However, the danger of her insight is
that, in the absence of a robust system of support for poor families and in the presence of
the dismantling of the welfare state, poverty’s effect on families’ ability to develop citizens can be used to justify state intervention in poor families.
139
For an exploration of the simultaneity of “American” values and the values associated with market capitalism, see Bridges, Wily Patients, supra note 1, at 20–22; see also
NICHOLAS DE GENOVA & ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, LATINO CROSSINGS: MEXICANS, PUERTO
RICANS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 78 (2003) (“[T]he quiet and routine
exploitation of seemingly docile ‘immigrants’ can be conveniently reinterpreted by employers—as ‘hard work,’ the stuff that perpetually animates the ‘American Dream.’ ”).
140
If entity privacy is respected because state noninterference allows parents to cultivate “diverse private preferences [and] moral values” in their children, then when entity
privacy is not respected, it demonstrates a distrust of those private preferences and moral
values that parents would instill. Dailey, Developing Citizens, supra note 134, at 482.
See also Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 785 (noting that state intervention in
families “minimize[s] or eliminate[s] these families as sites of production of values that
diverge from that status quo”); Storrow, supra note 76, at 566 (noting that state noninterference in families is “basic to the structure of our society because the family is ‘the
institution by which we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
morals and culture’ ” (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979))). Perhaps the
state fears that poor parents will cultivate a “preference” for removing oneself from the
labor market and the “moral value” of economic dependence. See Dailey, Developing
Citizens, supra note 134, at 483 (“One approach to the problem of parental authority in a
democracy has been to set some limits on acceptable parental values and behavior.”).
141
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990).
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ment of heteronormative ideals in terms of the marital status of the parents
still does not enjoy the entity privacy that would otherwise entitle the natural
parents to parent their children without state intervention. Indeed, this fact
suggests that the economic insufficiency of the family is the commitment
that has not been demonstrated. In line with Justice Stevens’ reasoning, parents who have not triumphed financially within capitalism have not demonstrated an adequate commitment to their children.
Economic self-sufficiency is the unspoken condition of possibility upon
which state noninterference rests.142 As one scholar writes, “[A] long tradition of family case law extols the ‘autonomous’ family unit and protects it,
except in the most compelling circumstances, from state intervention.”143 I
emphasize the use of “autonomous.” Because the families that seek prenatal care services from Alpha are dependent upon the government for their
economic viability, they cannot be said to exist within autonomous family
units; these families instead exist, or persist, as a result of government intervention. Any commitment to governmental noninterference in the family
that might otherwise exist is nullified by “public families’” inability to be
that “autonomous family unit” that traditional liberal theory posits as existing prior to, or otherwise independent of, state intervention. “Public families,” because they confound the public/private dichotomy that is the
foundation of the liberal state, are marked as sites where the intervention of
the state into the family can be effected without threatening the social order.
Olsen similarly notes that the family is conceptualized as an “independent” institution within liberal political theory—making it possible to rationalize state intervention into “public families” as a consequence of these
families’ nonconformance to traditional schemas due to their dependence on
public assistance.144 She writes that one of “[t]he basic assumptions that
142
Indeed, the Court, in the course of holding that the Amish families in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), were entitled to state noninterference in their decisions to
reject formal education for their children after they had completed the eighth grade,
makes much of the economic self-sufficiency of the Amish families. The Court writes
that, while the Amish may have “idiosyncrasies” that distinguish them from mainstream
society, “[i]ts members are productive and very law-abiding members of society [who]
reject public welfare in any of its usual modern forms.” Id. at 222 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 222 n.11 (observing that “the Green County Amish had never been known to
commit crimes, that none had been known to receive public assistance, and that none
were unemployed”) (emphasis added); id. at 223 (noting the “self-sufficiency of the community”); id. at 224 (noting that there had been no showing that “upon leaving the Amish
community Amish children, with their practical agricultural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become burdens on society because of educational shortcomings”); id. (“There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of
reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in today’s society.”); id. at 234 (arguing that the state had not demonstrated that removing
Amish children from traditional schools after the eighth grade would “result in an inability to be self-supporting”); id. at 235 (noting the Amish’s “long history as a successful
and self-sufficient segment of American society”).
143
Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1539 (1994).
144
See Olsen, supra note 95, at 1504.
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underlie arguments in favor of the private family” is that “the family is
capable of existing in some sense apart from state activity, as a natural formation rather than only as a creation of the state.”145 Yet, “public families”
violate this “basic assumption.” Indeed, their acceptance of money and services from public coffers inverts the description that is thought to govern the
relationship between the family and the state; instead of “existing in some
sense apart from state activity,” “public families” are thought to be viable
entities only as a result of state activity. Having confounded the logic of
state nonintervention, state intervention becomes the rule that governs the
state’s relationship to the family. Within the binary that situates “natural”
formations antithetically to state-inflected configurations, “public families”
lose their “naturalness”—and, consequently, their privacy.
One can say that having breached the assumption postulating the autonomy of the family, “public families” are thought to similarly defy the second assumption—that “‘the family’ is a coherent way of talking about [the]
relations among [these] people.”146 Without regard to whether the persons
in the family consider themselves as such, the “public family” within liberal
theory becomes a random, heterogeneous collection of individuals, ill-deserving of the designation of “family.”147 Further, the suppositions that are
concomitant with notions of the “family”—namely that the heads of such
families can competently raise the younger members of the families—do not
append to the association of individuals that is the “public family.” As the
limits that surround this “family”—marking the space that ought to be free
from the state’s presence—have been compromised by the financial dependence of the entity, the state’s presence is reiterated, becomes more brazen,
and acquires another directive: to raise the children in the face of the parents’
presumed inability to do so.

145

Id.
Id.
147
See Storrow, supra note 76, at 529 (arguing that “groups of persons not regarded
as families have no shield of privacy against governmental interference with their relationships”). Appell makes a similar argument in her analysis of the overrepresentation of
poor families of color within the foster care system in this country. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child
Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 579–80 (1997) [hereinafter Appell, Protecting
Children]. She notes that while there exists a “high political currency of ‘family values,’” id. at 579, poor families are frequently, and somewhat glibly, dismantled when the
foster care system intervenes in these families and seizes custody of children. She notes,
as a potential explanation of the ease with which the state extinguishes poor families, the
possibility that their families “are not viewed as ‘real families,’ so the larger society
tolerates their fissure . . . . This ‘othering’ of poor families, particularly when they are of
color, makes it easy for the dominant culture to devalue them: to view them as dysfunctional and not families at all.” Id. Similarly, “[j]ust as these families are not families,
these mothers are not really mothers.” Id. I will take up this point further in the following Part.
146
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B. The Myth of Entity Privacy?
Teitelbaum makes an interesting claim that ought to be considered
alongside the question of “public families” and the entity privacy that is not
afforded to them.148 He argues that “social, political, intellectual, and legal”
historians have generally agreed with one another that the industrialization
of the economy and the progression of capitalism produced the family as an
entity to be counterpoised to the market; because the sphere of commodity
exchange was decidedly public, the family became the designedly private
refuge from the self-interested jockeying within the market.149 He writes:
Liberal theory sees the nineteenth century family as a functional
response to industrial capitalism . . . . The family as refuge, in
which the wife assumed a special role in preserving moral values,
managing the home, and rearing the children was an essential condition of survival in industrial society: no man could endure an
unrelieved competitive existence.150
He argues that the family within critical theories has been similarly conceptualized.151 Teitelbaum argues that in most theories postulated by historians,
the privatization of the family parallels the development of the public sphere
of market relations.152
Teitelbaum was one of many who sought to explode commonly-held
notions of the private family by underscoring the interest that the state has
had in the family throughout history.153 This sustained public interest in the
family—an interest that not uncommonly manifested in state assumption of
custody of children within “inadequate” families—defeats any position that
would hold the family to be a private entity.
This reading, if applied to the poor, pregnant women whom I encountered within the Alpha obstetrics clinic, could be used to argue that that
148

Lee Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 197 (2006).
Id. at 199.
150
Id.
151
Id. (“The Marxist theory of the family is not crucially different. Small households, in which the wife performed uncompensated services, facilitated both the amassing
of capital and then its expenditure on industrial commodities. In at least this sense, the
bourgeois family is an integral part of the capitalist economy. Changes in the family . . .
respond directly to changes in economic arrangements or demands.”) (footnote omitted).
152
Id. at 200–06 (describing a “general theory of family history” in which the predominant view of the family is “developmental, moving from an hierarchically ordered
household closely integrated with the community towards an egalitarian, companionate
family sharply separated from the public world”). Id. at 200, 206.
153
Teitelbaum is not alone in his dissidence; Dailey joins him, articulating a “competing, subversive strand within both family history and constitutional case law . . .
[which] argues that the modern family has never constituted a purely private institution,
but has always been subject to state regulation and public control” and noting “the extensive state involvement in the formation and structure of the family as well as on the
family’s political role in both facilitating and constraining governmental power.” Dailey,
Constitutional Privacy, supra note 113, at 994.
149
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which is in operation during their attempts at Medicaid-subsidized prenatal
care is not the violation of the “entity privacy” —as the family entity has
never, throughout history, enjoyed privacy in any coherent sense of the
word. Instead, the programmatic inquiry into the affairs of the woman, and
consequently the family, who will be the primary influence upon the unborn
child is simply another incidence of the exercise of the public interest in the
family. This interpretation would suggest that there is nothing anomalous
about this exercise; neither does it reveal anything about the sociopolitical
location of these particular families. Instead, the apparatus erected by Medicaid within the Alpha obstetrics clinic evidences a concern that has applied
to all families throughout the history of the nation.
It is undeniable that the state-qua-public indeed has had a long-standing
interest in the family as the formation within which future citizens of the
society originate. However, what should not be elided is that some family
formations are more susceptible than others to becoming objects of the
state’s interest in protecting its future citizens. Moreover, the characteristic
that determines the ability of the public interest to reach a particular family
is class. That is, it is the class of the family that tends to determine whether
state power will be able to touch it and, consequently, whether the public
interest in the raising of children will be realized in any particular
instance.154
The obstetrics clinic of a public hospital is a public space par excellence
within which the state can find subjects upon which to exercise its regulatory, and potentially punitive, power. Without the capture of a subject upon
which to implement its power, the state interest in the family remains abstract and theoretical; it exists, but nominally so. However, the poverty of
an individual or a family produces them as a medium upon which the state
can enact its promises. It is through them that the state interest can become
material and tangible. Essentially, the physicality of the poor body asking
for state assistance within the clinic enables the actualization of that which
might otherwise exist in theory only.
Moreover, “public families” might be understood to allow the explicit
demonstration of a power that the state has over all families—a power that
some may have denied and buried beneath romantic notions of the family’s
insularity. As such, “public families” reveal the precariousness of all families’ privacy. The invasive prodding to which “public families” are exposed
154

Appell makes this point cogently and eloquently:
Poor families are more susceptible to state intervention because they lack power
and resources and because they are more directly involved with governmental
agencies . . . . [P]oor families lead more public lives than their middle-class
counterparts: rather than visiting private doctors, poor families are likely to attend
public clinics and emergency rooms for routine medical care; rather than hiring
contractors to fix their homes, poor families encounter public building inspectors;
rather than using their cars to run errands, poor mothers use public transportation.
Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 147, at 584 (footnote omitted).
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demonstrates the existence of a reviled power that is universally available to
all; thus, “public families” become produced as a site for revulsion. The
projection of disgust for the power onto that which makes the power visible
may explain the dearth of sympathy for the families so invaded.155
IV. THE OVERWHELMING

OF

RIGHTS

BY

STATE INTERESTS

That “public families” do not enjoy an entity privacy that the state is
bound to respect—an entity privacy that is, arguably, still enjoyed by nonpoor families—represents only one instance of the failure of privacy rights/
liberty interests to manifest within the space of the Alpha obstetrics clinic.
What I will explore in this Part is the sense in which individual privacy
rights/liberty interests similarly fail to manifest within the clinic. Essentially, the intrusive inquiries required by the state prior to Medicaid subsidization of prenatal care expenses demonstrate that the women who seek
prenatal care from Alpha Hospital are apprehended as subjects whose privacy rights the state is not bound to respect. This Part explores the sense in
which the individual privacy rights/liberty interests of the poor, pregnant
women that I encountered within the Alpha Hospital have been compromised by their economic dependence.
It may be unreasonable to expect entity privacy to protect “public families” from state intervention owing to the fact that entity privacy may be
solely spectral, phantasmic and without substance. The line of reasoning
would contend that the holding in Michael H. was an anomaly, an exception
to the contemporary articulation of the right to privacy as an individualinhering right or interest. As discussed above, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey—
the last in the triumvirate having been decided subsequent to Michael H.—
have firmly established the current right to privacy/liberty interest as one
that proscribes the state from intervening in certain “private” aspects of the
individual’s life.156 If this argument is correct, it makes more sense to interrogate the ways in which the programmatic inquiries posed by the state prior
to Medicaid subsidization of prenatal care violate not the entity privacy of
the poor family, but the right of the poor woman to individual privacy.157
155
The dearth of sympathy for “public families” invaded by state power may be
evidenced most competently by the fact that PCAP and other similar state laws remain on
the books and are materialized in clinics across the nation every day, having not been
repealed through democratic processes.
156
See supra Parts II.A–B.
157
But, at certain moments, she who attempts to disentangle individual privacy from
entity privacy is engaged in a perilous enterprise. This is due to the fact that the individual right of parental autonomy regarding private matters (i.e., those that pertain to the
family and the individual’s children) looks a lot like the right of the family to be free from
state intervention. See Rosenbury, supra note 137, at 866 (“[E]ntity-based privacy usually amounts to parental autonomy—the right of parents to speak for their children and to
make decisions about their upbringing, free from state intrusion.”). Nevertheless, some
would maintain that the language of individual privacy (as the right of an individual to
decisional autonomy regarding matters that pertain to her family) must be employed if
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The argument would be that, in order to follow the tack that privacy jurisprudence has taken since Eisenstadt, we ought to ask how the demand for
knowledge concerning the intimate provinces of a woman’s life is a violation
of the woman’s individual right to keep these intimate details to herself. We
ought to also ask how the interjection of the state into the woman’s decisionmaking process regarding parenting and future childbearing is a violation of
the woman’s individual right to make these decisions without state interference and coercion. We may then conclude that it infringes on the woman’s
individual-inhering privacy right/liberty interests to compel her to give details about her eating habits, sexual history, past and present tobacco, drug
and alcohol use and/or abuse, employment status, history of domestic or
sexual violence, past and present contact with state agencies, history of
physical or emotional abuse, past and present receipt of financial assistance
from the government, etc. We may then conclude that it infringes on the
woman’s individual-inhering privacy right/liberty interests to stipulate that in
order for her to receive a welfare benefit, she allow the state into her decisions concerning “whether to bear or beget a child” by compelling her to
undergo mandatory contraception counseling. Essentially, the state compels
the woman to make her private life available to state surveillance, intervention, and regulation; the analysis is properly focused when it asks how this
compulsion violates her individual right to privacy/liberty interests—not the
entity privacy of her family.
When formulated in this way, we must consider the ostensible motivation for the state’s inquiry: the governmental interest in protecting the unborn
child and the child, once she/he is born, from abuse or neglect.158 Indeed, the
state’s inquest and its ability to limit individual rights is arguably a product
of its power of parens patriae, by which the state has authority to intervene
in the family in order to protect children.159 This interest in child protection,
it may be argued, must be pursued without regard to the damage that it
inflicts upon the integrity of the woman’s right to privacy/liberty interest in
privacy. The exhaustive itemization of the particularities of the woman’s
existence enables the state to ascertain the environment into which the woonly because entity privacy—in spite of Michael H.—is no longer a cognizable right
subsequent to Eisenstadt. See id. at 864. (“The right [to entity privacy] is frequently
viewed as attaching to parents as individuals, not to the family as a whole.”).
158
Appell has noted instructively that “abuse” and “neglect” are not objective concepts, but rather may embody classist and racist preferences. See Appell, Virtual
Mothers, supra note 18, at 788–89 (“Neglect and, to a lesser extent, abuse, are problematic standards that are extraordinarily contingent on cultural norms of decisionmakers.
Many . . . have criticized these standards as class-based and racially discriminatory.”). It
may also be noted that the counseling could be interpreted as being geared towards maximizing the health of the fetus and subsequent infant. However, there is a concomitant
presumption that the mother is incapable of, or unwilling to, ensure the health of the fetus
and subsequent infant absent the state’s intervention (and, thus, potentially a poor parent).
159
See Hamilton, supra note 78, at 42–43 (describing the concept of parens patriae
as existing in tension with parental authority and noting that the state exercises its power
of parens patriae in order to “protect families’ more vulnerable members”).
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man’s child will be born as well as the likelihood that the woman will properly parent the child once born. It is pursuant to this state interest that
intimate, private data about the woman is gathered. For example, any prior
contact that a woman has had with the Administration for Child Services
(“ACS”), which investigates charges of child abuse and neglect, is inquired
into because it plausibly evidences a history of poor parenting and, by implication, indicates that the woman is likely to be a poor parent in the future.
The same is true of inquiries that, for example, confirm that a woman continues to smoke cigarettes, drink alcohol, or use illegal drugs although she is
aware that she is pregnant; the information is thought to index a woman’s
neglect of herself and, through and simultaneous to that neglect, the neglect
of her fetus.160 If the encyclopedic inquisitive net cast by the state indicates
that a woman is likely to be a poor parent, the state will use the information
gathered to maintain her within its regulatory apparatus in order to protect
the child once it is born. The exhaustiveness of the inquest—and that it
touches on information that the woman may consider private—is necessary,
it may be argued, because the end in mind, always, is the protection of the
child. The means to this end, the violation of poor women’s right to privacy/
liberty interest in privacy, is thought to be an unfortunate, yet inevitable,
happenstance.
This conflict—between the individual’s interest in protecting herself
from state intervention in matters that pertain to herself and her family, on
the one hand, and the state’s interest in protecting the child from the parent
who raises her, on the other—has been industriously explored within the

160
Scholars have noted how the state translates a pregnant woman’s perceived neglect of her fetus into a presumption that she will be a poor parent in the context of
determinations of parental unfitness and the termination of parental rights of women who
drink alcohol or use illegal drugs while pregnant. See, e.g., David C. Brody & Heidee
McMillin, Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and Governmental Foolhardiness Through
Collaborative Linkages, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Common Sense: Helping Women
Help Themselves, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243, 250 (2001) (noting several cases in
which courts found that a pregnant woman’s use of drugs or alcohol during pregnancy
authorized the removal from the mother’s custody of the infant once born and any siblings); Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v.
Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1050–51 (1999) (citing a brief submitted to a Colorado court
in which state officials argued that the parental rights of a pregnant drug user should be
terminated before the child was born because of the “[m]other’s unfitness during the
critical prenatal care stages of her pregnancy”) (alteration in original); Ian Vandewalker,
Taking the Baby Before It’s Born: Termination of the Parental Rights of Women who Use
Illegal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 423, 423 (2008)
(“Several states allow a mother and child to be permanently separated for something the
mother did before the child was born. These states have made the use of illegal drugs
while pregnant a ground for terminating a mother’s parental rights. The intuition motivating such a policy is that drug users are bad parents, and the state protects children by
removing them from such parents.”) (footnote omitted); see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
50/1(D)(t) (2010) (defining an “unfit person” who is legally incapable of having custody
of a child as someone who is responsible for the presence in “the child’s blood, urine, or
meconium [of] any amount of a controlled substance”).
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literature that investigates the foster care system.161 Although many scholars
problematize the discriminatory enforcement of child protection laws insofar
as poor, racially-subjugated families are swept within the state’s regulatory
ambit at disproportionately high rates,162 most scholars do not question that it
is licit for the state to limit parental rights when the circumstances demand
it. “The state has the right to intervene within the family or parent-child
relationship as long as it has a significant interest.”163 Moreover, a “significant interest” that constitutes the condition of possibility for the legitimate
limitation of parental rights is the state’s interest in keeping the child safe
from harm—even (or, perhaps, especially) if the threat comes from the
child’s own parent.164 This tension between parental rights and the state’s
interest in child protection is dramatized daily in the child protection
system.165
Most scholars do not question the legitimacy of the state’s parens patriae power to limit or countermand the individual’s (parental) right to direct
the upbringing of her child as long as the state acts to protect the child.166
161
Dorothy Roberts has also explored this conflict in her analysis of the prosecutions
of pregnant drug addicts. See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 18, at 1422
(“[P]unishing a woman for using drugs during pregnancy pits the state’s interest in protecting the future health of a child against the mother’s interest in autonomy over her
reproductive life—interests that until recently had not been thought to be in conflict.”).
162
See, e.g., Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 147, at 580 (analyzing “the
policies, practices, and perspectives that help to fuel the growing industry that has arisen
from the state’s ‘protective’ involvement with poor families and families of color and the
state’s punitive treatment of the mothers of these families”); Appell, Virtual Mothers,
supra note 18, at 770–79 (describing the predominance of poor families of color within
the child protection system); Cahn, supra note 18, at 1244 (noting that poor women are
more likely to be swept up within the ambit of child protection systems and agencies);
Sally K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice for All, 36 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1, 12–15 (2002) (investigating the causes of the overrepresentation of poor
and African American children in foster care).
163
Christie, supra note 162, at 27.
164
See Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 703 (observing that parents have
rights to raise their children without state interference “absent proof that the parent is
abusing or neglecting the[ir] child[ren]”); Fineman, Family Privacy, supra note 78, at
1215 (noting that parental conduct is deferred to unless it is abusive or neglectful); Rosenbury, supra note 137, at 846 (observing that the state may intervene in the parent-child
relationship in order to protect the child’s welfare).
165
Mangold, supra note 136, at 74 (“While parents have a right to raise their children
free from state intervention, children have a countervailing right to protection from abuse
and neglect. This tension between parental rights and child protection is the key conflict
in the child protection system . . . .”); see also Hamilton, supra note 78, at 43 (“The state
intervenes in the ‘intact’ family in limited situations—namely, when it perceives a serious
threat to the physical or mental health of the child, and even then, not in all cases.”)
(footnotes omitted).
166
See, e.g., Storrow, supra note 76, at 575 (“[P]arens patriae is not properly invoked ‘except when necessary for the protection of the child.’ ”) (footnote omitted).
Some scholars would argue that the rights that are overridden by the state’s power of
parens patriae are parental rights—not individual rights; that is, they would argue that
parental rights are not a type of individual right, but rather are entirely distinct from them.
See, e.g., Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 18, at 697–98 (“[T]hese parental rights are
not individual rights, but rights that arise out of these relationships and apply to decisions
for or about others. They are distinct from other decisional privacy rights that involve
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This uncontroversial formulation of the condition precedent for the legitimate limitation of parental rights raises an intriguing question when it is
analogized to the women seeking prenatal care within the Alpha obstetrics
clinic. But first, a caveat: the analogy to the state’s power of parens patriae
and its ability to limit parental rights must be adapted a bit to the circumstance confronted by poor, pregnant women in the Alpha obstetrics clinic.
The doctrine of parens patriae allows the state to supersede the individual’s
right to direct the upbringing of his/her child—a right that may be understood in the language of privacy rights/liberty interests.167 However, the privacy right/liberty interest that is abridged in the Alpha obstetrics clinic is not
so much the individual’s right to direct the upbringing of her child, but rather
the individual’s right to keep private, intimate information to herself and to
make decisions autonomously. Nevertheless, the comparison is instructive.
When one makes the analogy between the state’s power of parens patriae and the circumstance confronted by poor, pregnant women attempting
to receive a welfare benefit in the form of state subsidization of prenatal
healthcare expenses, and when one observes that the state’s use of its parens
patriae power to limit an individual’s (parental) rights is legitimate only
when it seeks to protect a child from abuse and neglect, one can conclude
that the limitation of poor, pregnant women’s individual (privacy) rights is
legitimate as long as it is premised on the protection of children from abuse
and neglect. But, one must ask: why is the state convinced—so much so
that it has erected an elaborate, cumbersome, bureaucratic apparatus—that
the children born (or to be born) to poor women are in need of protection
such that the meticulous and methodical audit of all of the pregnant poor is
imperative?168 It deserves underscoring that, if the formulation described
above is true and the state only legitimately nullifies individual (parental or
privacy) rights when it acts to protect the child, then the PCAP apparatus is
either illegitimate, or it is the legitimate result of the state’s interest in protecting poor, pregnant women’s children. If the latter, one must ask: why

decision making for oneself.”) (footnotes omitted). However, many scholars elide, or
otherwise do not recognize, the distinction. See id. (noting that many commentators conceptualize parental rights as a species of individual rights). For the purpose of putting the
state’s general power of parens patriae in conversation with the circumstance confronted
by poor women attempting to enroll in PCAP, I, too, conceptualize parental rights as a
species of individual rights.
167
See Hamilton, supra note 78, at 42 (“The concept of privacy restrains the state’s
ability to interfere in the family.”); Rosenbury, supra note 137, at 862 (noting that “most
protections of parental authority sound in privacy”).
168
Hasday has also questioned why regimes of family law have comfortably tolerated
the denial of rights to poor parents and families in the absence of actual child abuse and/
or neglect. See Hasday, supra note 11, at 385 (“[T]he tradition of legal regulation extending from the child cruelty societies to [TANF] evinces an enthusiasm for disrupting
parental prerogatives that turns on particular forms of economic failure rather than . . .
actual evidence of child abuse.”).
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does the state presume that poor, pregnant women will abuse or neglect their
children?169
The salient characteristic that is shared by all women seeking prenatal
care at Alpha is their poverty. Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that it
is this characteristic that casts suspicion over poor women’s ability to not fail
their children such that state nullification of these women’s privacy rights is
rational, expected, and appropriate. The most benign interpretation of this
fact states, simply, that a mother’s poverty yields the possibility that she will
be unable to meet the material needs of her child. Indeed, the inability of a
parent to provide for the material subsistence of her child has, in the past,
justified the removal of the child from the parent’s home by child protective
agencies.170 The benign interpretation posits that the state nullifies a woman’s right to privacy because in her poverty, the state assumes a likelihood
of parental neglect in the form of the inability to meet an infant’s basic,
fundamental needs.
169
While some scholars observe that the state has arguably expanded its power of
parens patriae and may intervene in the family more frequently than it did in years past,
none have argued that this expansion is legitimate when the state uses its power to intervene in the family preemptively—that is, absent proof of abuse or neglect or the parent’s
demonstrated propensity to abuse or neglect a child. See Hamilton, supra note 78, at 64
(observing that states have given themselves even broader powers of parens patriae in
recent years).
170
In 1998, it was estimated that ten percent of the children removed from their
parents’ homes by the state were so removed because of “environmental neglect”—defined as the lack of those basic materials that persons need to survive (i.e., food, clothing,
and housing). Christie, supra note 162, at 13. Christie also perceptively notes that a
family’s poverty may also cause stress within the unit, which child protective agents may
perceive as abuse or neglect of the child: “Poverty can also lead to added stress and
greater tension within poorer families. Upon seeing such tensions, caseworkers evaluating these families may conclude that a child is better off in foster care.” Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted). On this issue, Appell persuasively describes how the poverty of a woman
may be perceived as abuse or neglect by state agents whose socioeconomic status preclude their ability to empathize with those who are subject to abuse or neglect investigations. I quote her at length:
Food, jobs, and decent housing are elusive. Five sisters may live together with
their fifteen children in a roach infested slum: their only other housing option
being a roach infested apartment in a public housing high-rise where their children will be in daily danger of being shot or “shaken down.” Because they live
where they do, the state charges these mothers with neglect for subjecting their
children to an injurious environment.
These mothers do not have access to affordable childcare. They depend on
informal kinship and community networks for babysitting. If a mother leaves her
child with a neighbor or an aunt, rather than a nanny or a licensed day-care center,
she is considered to have neglected her child . . . .
Poor mothers are more likely to live in high risk areas under high stress related
to the blight and violence which surrounds them and under the strain of living on
government benefits that are below subsistence level . . . . When judged by someone who has a car or car-fare and who does not have to spend much time worrying about obtaining food, clean clothing, toiletries, or dodging bullets and crack
dealers, these mothers appear not to care enough about mothering.
Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 147, at 585–86 (footnotes omitted).
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However, were this benign interpretation true, the questions asked of
women upon their initiation of prenatal care would concern, more specifically, their ability to provide food, clothing, and shelter for their children. If
this interpretation were true, the ambit of the state’s inquisition would focus
on the question of the woman’s economic viability and whether her financial
condition could support an expanded family. Instead, inquiries about women’s sexual histories, experiences with substance use and abuse, histories
of sexual and domestic violence, and strategies for preventing the conception
and birth of more children far exceed the purview of a concern about the
material conditions in which newborn children can expect to be placed. Indeed, a less benign interpretation is required: the state’s presumption of the
abusive potentials of the poor, pregnant women who present themselves at
Alpha is a consequence of the discursive construction of poverty as an index
of the moral integrity of the person so impoverished.171 Explicitly, the inability to thrive within a capitalist economy and the consequent reliance
upon the state for financial survival is thought to index a perceived moral
laxity that results in the production of unplanned, unwanted children and
their subsequent mistreatment and exploitation;172 moreover, the mistreatment and exploitation of children is sufficiently probable and expected that
171
Other scholars have made similar insights about the discursive construction of
poverty as an index of the poor person’s moral integrity. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN
AMERICA 17–18 (1991) (noting the “moral values of work” and arguing that, historically,
the poor have been constructed as “morally deviant” and arguing that “[s]tigmatizing
those who fail to conform affirms the moral worth of those who do”); MICHAEL KATZ, IN
THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA, at xi–xii
(1986) (“In the land of opportunity, poverty has seemed not only a misfortune but a
moral failure.”); Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 457, 467 (1987–88) (arguing that throughout history, “the failure to earn one’s
living was a moral failure”); Hasday, supra note 11, at 304–05 (observing that the New
York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children “focused on families that had not
been successful in the wage labor economy, operating on the principle that this economic
failure had been caused by some crucial moral or character flaw”); Jack Katz, Caste,
Class, and Counsel for the Poor, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 251, 251 (1985) (“In
modern society, poverty has been defined not only by quantitative measures of wellbeing but as a morally distinct category.”); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their
Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1501 (1991) (“The premise of moral
weakness suggests that the problem is really quite simple. If poor people simply chose to
‘straighten up and fly right,’ all would be well. If they would accept and commit to the
moral norms of those of us not in poverty, they would cease to be poor, albeit only after a
long time and much hard work.”).
172
Alternately, indigent mothers’ failure might be understood not as the inability to
sell their labor within market capitalism, but rather their failure to attach themselves to a
man who has successfully sold his labor such that women’s dependency is masked. See
Fineman, Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2182 (“Those members of society who
openly manifest the reality of dependency—either as dependents or caretakers in need of
economic subsidy—are rendered deviants. Unable to mask dependency by retreating to
contrived social institutions like the family, single mother caretakers in particular are
stigmatized . . . for embodying a dependency that society would rather deny.”). I thank
Kris Collins for making me aware of this argument.

R

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLG\34-1\HLG104.txt

164

unknown

Seq: 52

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

1-FEB-11

10:39

[Vol. 34

the prevention thereof justifies the violation or dramatic limitation of all
poor, pregnant women’s rights to be free from state intervention in private
matters.173 That there is a professed relationship between an individual’s ostensible failure as a purveyor of her labor and that same individual’s commitment to love, nurture, and care for her own children speaks to the power of
society’s commitment to capitalism.174
In this way, one can make sense of the term “social risk,” the term that
serves as the justification for requiring all women seeking Medicaid subsidization of their prenatal care expenses to submit to consultations with a social
worker: as explained to me by one of the social workers who works within
the Alpha obstetrics clinic, she and her colleague are required, by legislative
mandate, to consult with all Alpha prenatal care patients who have been
identified as at “social risk”; further, a woman is identified as at “social
risk” due to her mere status as a seeker of Medicaid subsidization of her
prenatal care expenses. Hence, a woman’s lack of access to private insurance through an employer and her inability to purchase it independent of that
channel serve to denote her poverty, and her poverty renders apposite and
obligatory an intrusive inquest into her private life.
Further, the content of what is designated by “social risk”—that is,
what exactly the poor woman, by virtue of her poverty, is at risk of—is
revealed when one examines the questions that are asked of women during
their requisite conference with the social worker. That “social risk” signifies more than the risk that the woman’s poverty will make her unable to
meet the material needs of her infant is made apparent by the fact that the
interrogation into the woman’s economic circumstances comprises only a
small portion of the consultation. That there are moralistic undercurrents
within the “social risk” designation is made obvious when the social worker
poses state-mandated questions into matters—like how long she has been in
a relationship with the father of her child, whether this pregnancy and previous pregnancies were unplanned, or whether she has thought about how she
173
It is interesting to consider an argument made by Dailey in this context: Dailey
argues that when the state refuses to intervene in the family—whether premised on entity
privacy or premised on the parental right to autonomy with regard to matters that concern
her child—the effect is the granting of rights to the parent over the child. She writes,
“[A]ny allotment of liberty to the parent necessarily diminishes the liberty of the child;
conversely, any enhancement of a child’s liberty curtails that of the parents . . . .
[P]arental rights entitle parents to rights against the state, but over another person.”
Dailey, Constitutional Privacy, supra note 113, at 986–87. Insofar as the Medicaid apparatus effectively dismantles any right that the woman-as-parent has against the state with
regard to her personal affairs that may (or may not) affect her child, then one can understand Medicaid as the manifestation of a distrust of the poor, pregnant woman: before
giving the poor, pregnant woman rights against the state over her child, the state must
deem her deserving of the right. Conversely, non-poor women receive this clearance as a
matter of course; it is a function of their class status.
174
Again, Hasday makes a similar observation in the context of the nineteenth century reform literature. See Hasday, supra note 11, at 323 (“[I]t reasoned that mothers
who failed to constantly supervise their children at home, and fathers who failed to make
that possible, had to lack love and concern for their children.”).
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will prevent future pregnancies175—that are irrelevant to a determination of
whether and how a pregnant woman will meet her infant’s basic requirements for food, shelter, and clothing.
Further still, even those questions that are designed to interrogate the
woman’s economic circumstances and whether she will be able to meet the
material needs of her infant—that is, queries that are legitimate insofar as
they are posed by a state concerned with the physical security of a woman’s
child—nevertheless produce a sense of discomfort and illegitimacy. This is
to say that although these questions seek information about the economic
sufficiency of the woman, they often produce a sense of disquietude within
the women being interrogated because they elicit information that damns the
woman within a hegemony that associates economic success with the moral
rectitude of the person.
Consider the excerpt of the interview with Erica, an indigent Black woman who was, at the time of her pregnancy, living in a shelter because of
domestic violence that she had experienced at the hands of a former boyfriend.176 When the social worker, Tina, asks Erica how she supports herself,
there is a long pause, after which Erica says, “How could I forget what it’s
called?” After another long pause, she answers, “Welfare!” Tina then asks
her if she receives “public assistance.” Erica answers in the affirmative.
Yet, her apparent inability to remember the signifier “welfare” is fascinating. Arguably, the “welfare” signifier, and the confession that it performs
of the dejectedness of the speaker’s economic-qua-moral position within
market capitalism, was so odious to Erica that she “forgot” it in an attempt
to spare herself the embarrassment of saying it out loud. Tina’s offer of the
signifier “public assistance,” then, could be understood as an effort to help
Erica describe her reliance upon state aid without the moralistic connotations
that “welfare” has acquired. Erica accepted the more morally agnostic
“public assistance,” and, consequently, later used “public assistance” to describe that upon which her fiancé relied for financial support. Also noteworthy is the defensive stance that Erica inhabited when speaking about her
fiancé’s financial future. Her fiancé’s expected annual salary of forty-three
thousand dollars would expiate at least some of the condemnation that, as a
175
Admittedly, it is possible to link a pregnant woman’s future pregnancies with her
ability to provide for the material needs of the fetus that she carries once born. However,
given the discursive condemnation of poor women’s fertility, it is nevertheless consistent
to interpret the institutional focus on future contraceptive use as evidencing a skepticism
of the moral integrity of the poor woman. For discussions regarding the regulation of
indigent women’s fertility, see DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 202–45 (1997) (discussing proposals to regulate the fertility of women who rely on state assistance and the constitutional implications
of them); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Welfare, 72 DENV. U.L. REV. 931, 945 (1995) [hereinafter Roberts, Unconstitutional
Conditions] (“Poor women are entitled to the benefits of society only if they agree not to
reproduce. According to these policies, an acceptable poor woman is one who consents
to use birth control: the only good poor woman is an infertile poor woman.”).
176
See supra Introduction.
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consequence of Erica and her partner’s present and avowedly temporary reliance upon public assistance, would be visited upon them within a hegemony
that associates the absence of economic self-sufficiency with immorality.
Tina’s statement that Erica was “in a better situation than a lot of [her]
patients” could be understood as a—perhaps magnanimous, perhaps disingenuous—gesture that allowed Erica to understand herself as morally distinct from other persons who really deserved the blame and censure that had
been given to Erica and her partner, i.e., those who were “really” at fault for
their poverty. When Erica could physically dissociate herself from those
persons, whom her fellow residents in the shelter came to represent, her
penitence would be complete and she would “be fine.”
I should note that the transcript of the interview fails to communicate
the palpable tension that was produced in the room when Tina began to ask
Erica about her relationship with the father of her children and the relationship that she had had with the man whose violence had forced her into a
shelter. After the interview, and after Erica had been escorted to the next
professional that she was scheduled to see that day, I asked Tina how she
would explain Erica’s protective deportment:
Tina: She wasn’t being open. She wasn’t being open. She was
being guarded. And she was being a little—if I had pushed her,
she might have gotten hostile. She was a bit hostile. I don’t know
if you picked up on it.
Khiara: What hostility did you see?
Tina: Just in the way that she was answering questions. It could
just be—she has built up a little bit of a roughness. It’s not as
blatant as other people. She has an edge. She has an edge. In
the—what?—ten minutes that she was here, I couldn’t tell you
how she is normally. Maybe that’s the way she is all the time.
But, I did perceive an edge. And you can imagine that if somebody was in a domestic violence situation and is now living in a
shelter, they might pick up an edge. And maybe if you have survived a domestic violence relationship, then it’s probably your
edge that got you through it.177
As mentioned earlier, however, the social worker’s interrogation into
the woman’s economic circumstances comprises only a fraction of her legislatively-mandated consultation with the woman seeking to initiate prenatal
care. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to conclude that “social risk” denotes more than the risk that the woman’s poverty will make her unable to
meet the material needs of her infant. The “social risk” condition of the
woman not only makes relevant questions about how a woman supports herself, but also makes legally relevant a slew of other intimate questions unrelated to economic circumstance. It is not outside the universe of reason to
177

Interview with Tina (July 3, 2007) (on file with the author).
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conclude that the woman’s poverty, which alone qualifies her as “social
risk,” is what makes questions that inquire into her moral integrity somehow
germane, and this because poverty is thought to index a moral permissiveness, the magnitude of which the state has the duty to determine and upon
which the health and safety of the woman’s unborn child hinges.
To the extent that the state’s intervention in the private lives of poor,
pregnant women is premised upon an ideology within which economic failure indexes a moral failure and the concomitant likelihood of harming a
child, a relevant query at this point is the extent to which the state is acting
to protect the child from abuse and neglect as opposed to merely punishing
the mother for her failure to thrive within capitalism. This is a question that
is also raised within the foster care reform literature, where scholars have
questioned the fact that child protective agencies frequently focus on the
perceived personal shortcomings of poor women and not on their ability to
parent their children.178 Instead of directing the inquiry to whether the child
has been harmed or is at risk of being harmed due to the actions or inactions
of the parent—that is, instead of protecting the child—child protective services frequently direct their inquiry to whether the parent (the mother, commonly) has made “good” choices in terms of sexual partners, drug and
alcohol usage, and educational attainment.179 The outcome is that the state
often intervenes into poor, single mothers’ families and seizes custody of
their children not because the children have been, or are at risk of being,
injured in some way, but rather because these poor, single mothers have
engaged themselves in supposedly insalubrious relationships with unsavory
men, have used drugs or alcohol, or have not otherwise lived their lives in
conformance with traditional social norms.180 The state focuses on the “inadequacies” within their personal lives as opposed to their competence to
parent. This “punitive maternal focus serves . . . to expand the scope of state
178
See, e.g., Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 147, at 579 (noting that poor
mothers of color “deviate from the normative notions of mother and womanhood and are
defined as bad,” resulting in an “often punitive, rather than empowering, system focused
more on mothers than on their children”); Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good
Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 6
(1995) (“From the beginning, the juvenile courts and the broader social welfare system
intervened in the lives of destitute women to regulate and monitor their behavior, punish
them for ‘deviant’ mothering practices, and police the undeserving poor.”); Justine A.
Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered
Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 588 (2004) (“[F]ailure-to-protect
charges cast the abused mother as a bad mother . . . . The system and the batterer have the
same refrain towards the mother: it—whatever ‘it’ is—is her fault. The charge revictimizes the mother by removing her children and premising their return on her conformity
with governmental edict.”); Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and
Termination of Parental Rights, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 62 (1995) (arguing that
termination of parental rights is often “not based on the mother having harmed the child,
but rather on the mother exhibiting the characteristics of being a bad woman” and concluding that “[s]ince bad women can never be good mothers, their relationships with
their children are terminated on that basis”).
179
Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 147, at 588.
180
Id. at 605.
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intervention beyond child protection into every realm of mothers’ lives in the
name of making them good mothers.”181
It is helpful to apply this critique to the pregnant women seeking prenatal care at Alpha Hospital and to take the analysis one step further: the PCAP
device not only improperly seeks to discover the inadequacies within women’s personal lives, but through the search for those inadequacies, the state
punishes the women for being poor and pregnant. Indeed, the scope of the
survey made by PCAP far exceeds the determination of whether a woman
has harmed her fetus or whether she will harm her child once delivered.
Instead, the inquiry focuses on coercing the confession of, and enabling the
documentation of, the personal failures of the woman. It should be emphasized that these particular women’s personal failures are assumed to be extant principally because these are women who have made the “imprudent,”
“irresponsible” decision of becoming pregnant and maintaining a pregnancy
when they have not managed to either attain economic self-sufficiency
within market capitalism or attach themselves to a man who has. Questions
are asked of a poor woman not because the child to whom she will give birth
might be wounded or wronged in some way by her mother’s imperfect diet,
cigarette smoked years ago, or the other banalities about which information
is demanded as a condition of the receipt of Medicaid. Instead, this information is gathered because the patient’s poverty is presumed to indicate the
absence of a moral vigilance that might manifest in harm to her child, and
also because, in the articulation of that information—in the routing of the
poor, pregnant woman’s right to privacy/liberty interests—the state exacts
punishment on the woman for allowing her poverty to intersect with her
pregnancy.
In the following Part, I explore a question that becomes emergent from
the inquiry: if the right to privacy/liberty interest in privacy can be preemptively limited because of the economic dependence of the rights-holder, can
one argue that that which is possessed by the poor is a “right” at all? Is the
right to privacy/liberty interest in privacy always already a function of class,
such that it is more accurate to speak of the absence of poor persons’ rights
instead of the violation of their rights?
V. THE BARTERING

OF

“RIGHTS”

There is an argument that PCAP does not demand the violation of the
privacy rights/liberty interests of poor, pregnant patients; instead, the women, through their acceptance of Medicaid and other forms of state aid, have
bartered away their rights to privacy/liberty interests.182 The disquisition of
181

Id. at 579–80.
See Roberts, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 175, at 941 (noting that
“[t]he sphere of privacy protected by liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual
invites in state assistance” and that “[a]n individual’s acceptance of government benefits
182
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intimacies mandated by Medicaid does not infringe upon women’s right to
privacy/liberty interests because these women have given away the privacy
rights/liberty interests that they have in exchange for government
assistance.183

is deemed to constitute a waiver of privacy”). The dilemma raised by the PCAP program
is a subset of the more general problem of unconstitutional conditions, a doctrine holding
that “government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender
a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989). As Sullivan argues, the doctrine is “riven with inconsistencies.” Id. at 1416–17
(describing cases in which the Court has held that a government action is an unconstitutional condition while declining to find an unconstitutional condition in cases with similar
fact patterns). Moreover, the Court has refused to find unconstitutional conditions imposed by state laws affecting the reproductive rights and autonomy of indigent women.
See id. at 1464, 1500–01 (discussing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), in which the Court held that the government’s funding of
indigent women’s childbirth-related expenses, but refusal to fund indigent women’s abortion-related expenses, did not force poor women to surrender their abortion rights in
exchange for a welfare benefit and was, therefore, not an unconstitutional condition).
Sullivan’s analysis of the doctrine reveals that, in many areas—some involving poor people, some not—the government may burden an individual’s constitutionally-protected
rights when the government concomitantly grants some benefit to that individual. See id.
at 1416–17. The question then becomes why the phenomenon discussed in this Article,
whereby indigent women and families are required to exchange privacy rights/liberty
interests for a welfare benefit, should raise our hackles any more than the other myriad
areas in which the government requires individuals to relinquish rights in exchange for a
benefit. The answer may be that this particular exchange has little justification. As
Hasday has argued, very little time and energy have been devoted to justifying the twotiered system of family law. She writes:
Why should it be the case that a . . . mother and child’s call for government
support through certain tainted programs[ ] is still enough to subject every member of that family to legal rules and presumptions that are interventionist, instrumental, and wholly opposed to those conventionally associated with family law?
Why should the law sustain two separate and very different normative regimes for
governing parenthood whose application turns on whether money is transferred in
this particular social modality?
Hasday, supra note 11, at 385. Further, when one acknowledges that the exchange has
effects that may be repulsive to our notions of equality, effectively producing a class of
people and families that have robust rights and a class of people and families with no
rights about which to speak, it may be that we conclude that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in this area should work to strike down laws like the ones discussed in
the present Article. See Sullivan, supra, at 1497–99 (describing the creation of a “system
of constitutional caste” when the government may restrict the constitutional rights of
some (i.e., the poor) but not others).
183
In an influential article, Rubenfeld has argued that the right to privacy protects
individuals from being standardized by a biopolitical state interested in normalizing its
citizens. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989)
(arguing that without a right to privacy, there is a danger of a “particular kind of creeping
totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individuals’ lives”). If poor persons, indeed,
must barter their right to privacy for a government benefit, Rubenfeld’s insight reveals
that this exchange is required because of the belief that it is to the benefit of society that
the poor become normalized. The state takes their request for government assistance as
an opportunity to “occupy” the lives of the poor—to normalize the abnormal who, due to
their indigence, have existed on the margins of society.
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In a different, but related, context, Roberts explores the constitutionality of requiring poor women to surrender their privacy rights in order to
receive government assistance: she analyzes welfare reform proposals made
by several states, pursuant to which the provision of a welfare grant to a
woman is conditioned on her use of contraception.184 As outlined by Roberts, there are numerous variations on this theme:
The most benign is to make contraceptives freely available to welfare recipients . . . . This approach might be combined with the
added incentive of offering a cash bonus to women on welfare for
using [contraceptives] . . . . A third option is to deny additional
benefits for children born to women who are already receiving
public assistance . . . .
A fourth possibility is to use more coercive means to ensure
that women receiving government aid remain infertile . . . . At
least two states have proposed legislation to mandate the use of [a
temporary, yet long-term contraceptive device] as a condition of
receiving welfare benefits.185
In order to avoid the conclusion that such proposals are manifestations
of the hegemonic devaluation of poor women’s fertility, one must accept
some vision of the dissolution of the protective boundary around poor women’s private affairs upon their acceptance of public assistance. Through her
receipt of public aid, she has declined to “immunize [her] private sphere
from state interference.”186 As a result, “[t]he sphere of privacy protected
by liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual invites in state assistance. An individual’s acceptance of government benefits is deemed to constitute a waiver of privacy.” 187 Thus, “the government’s spending power” is
used as a technique with which to “supervise the everyday lives of poor
families.”188
Roberts acknowledges that an inevitable tension arises when a demand
for government intervention in the form of welfare entitlements is simultaneous to a demand for government nonintervention in the form of a woman’s
right to determine her reproductive present and future. She writes that those
184
See Roberts, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 175, at 933–34; see also
Cahn, supra note 18, at 1243 (noting the history of welfare programs that make women
comply with “morality requirements” as a condition of receiving state aid).
185
Roberts, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 175, at 933–34.
186
Id. at 940.
187
Id. at 941.
188
Id. As another example of how the offer of state aid forces women to cede access
to other aspects of their lives that do not readily appear to exist within the purview of that
aid, Roberts cites the “man-in-the-house” rules, which allowed states to condition the
granting of welfare benefits on the recipients’ conformance to the state’s notion of “appropriate” sexual behavior for unmarried women. Id. at 942. And, “[m]ore recently,
women on welfare have been required, as a condition of receiving benefits, to undergo
mandatory paternity proceedings that include state scrutiny of their intimate lives.” Id. at
942.
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who would champion the persistence of welfare recipients’ privacy rights
paradoxically seek to:
disconnect the demand for privacy from government intrusion and
the demand for government intervention through financial support.
[T hey] rel[y] on the liberal resistance to government while hoping for the illiberal assistance of government . . . . [They] require[ ] us to close our eyes for a moment and pretend that poor
women are not dependent on government assistance; then we may
open our eyes the next moment and plead for government support
for their decision to have children.189
Those who find the PCAP apparatus discomforting in light of its ostensible vacating of poor women’s privacy rights/liberty interests are faced with
the same tension articulated by Roberts—a tension that is produced at the
intersection of the woman’s petition for Medicaid subsidization of her
healthcare expenses with her desire to maintain the invisibility of her intimate affairs. We are asked to understand the disquietude generated by this
felt tension as the quixotic longing for the persistence of the poor woman’s
privacy rights/liberty interests. We are told to surrender our notions of the
inalienability of rights like the right to privacy. And we are expected to
realize that the conflict exists only when we insist upon the continuance of
the woman’s privacy right/liberty interests; indeed, when we allow that the
woman has bartered her rights in exchange for government assistance, the
tension resolves and in its place remains a “legitimate,” unfettered state
presence in women’s private lives.
This begs the question: what does it reveal about the nature of rights in
our particular sociopolitical location when a right—once imagined as fundamental among jurists and legal scholars, as well as among those who believe
themselves to be in possession of it—is so easily bartered away? Perhaps
we misspeak when we assert that poor women’s rights have been exchanged
for state assistance. And perhaps we dissemble the actual nature of rights
within our political economy when we claim that the state violates the
“right” of the pregnant woman seeking Medicaid coverage of her prenatal
care expenses. Perhaps nothing has been bartered, nothing has been
violated.
That is, perhaps “rights” are always already a function of class, such
that the poor do not have any rights about which to speak. The Medicaidmandated apparatus within the Alpha obstetrics clinic does not violate the
rights of the pregnant patients because their socioeconomic status precludes
their possession of any “rights” that the state is bound to respect. Many
scholars have intimated towards this conclusion without decisively arriving

189

Id. at 940.
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at it.190 For example, in her attempt to problematize Fineman’s notion of the
“public family” by attempting to add a class analysis to a problematic that
proceeds solely upon gender lines, Roberts notes that while “single mothers’
privacy is based on patriarchal definitions of the family, it is also true that
dependence on government aid provides an additional rationale, as well as
the opportunity, for state regulation. Wealth can help to buy the presumption of privacy.” 191 That which is at operation within the Alpha obstetrics
clinic calls into question whether Roberts’ formulation, while true, is sufficiently robust. It is not that Alpha patients, because of their poverty, do not
have presumptions of privacy; rather, their privacy is presumed altogether
nonexistent. So framed, it does not appear that wealth helps to buy the presumption of privacy, but rather wealth is the condition of possibility for privacy.192 Class is the salient characteristic within Alpha because it enables an
190
See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 18, at 1242 (observing that privacy depends on class);
Gilman, supra note 18, at 18 (“[F]or poor women, this privacy ‘right’ can be illusory if
they lack the resources to exercise it.”). Attendant to Appell’s argument for foster care
reform, she notes the existence of a private family law system for the wealthy and a
public family law system for the poor; while the private system helps to resolve custody
disputes between wealthier parents, the public system resolves custody disputes between
poor mothers and the state. See Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 147, at 581. She
notes that “[a] key difference between the private and public systems, at least historically, is that the former is more deferential to parental rights and family autonomy,
whereas the latter is more tolerant of, indeed at times has mandated, state usurpation of
custody.” Id. If what I have suggested is true, and rights that are easily bartered are not
rights at all, then it is inaccurate to contend that, upon their receipt of public benefits, the
poor mothers whose familial drama is negotiated within the public system have bartered
away any entity privacy rights, parental rights, or individual privacy rights. Rather, their
poverty renders their rights illusory; consequently, the public system is more tolerant of
the state usurpation of a child’s custody because the parents whose claims are adjudicated
there do not have any rights with which they can argue against the prospect of state
usurpation of custody. Indeed, that which explains why the private system is “more
deferential to parental rights” is the fact that the wealthier individuals whose claims are
adjudicated there actually possess parental rights to which the state may show deference.
191
Roberts, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 175, at 943.
192
In a similar vein, Roth suggests that rights may be a function of the right-holder’s
power to defend the right. See Louise Marie Roth, The Right to Privacy is Political:
Power, the Boundary Between Public and Private, and Sexual Harassment, 24 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 45, 45 (1999). She argues that the discursive boundary between the public
and private is contingent, shifting, and subject to the influence of systemic social power.
Id. at 56. Thus, those with power have the ability to define that which is public and that
which is private; further, these powerful few also have the ability to defend those elements of life that have been identified as private from the public. Id. at 47. In contrast,
the powerless can only receive definitions of public and private from those who make
those determinations; further, the powerless many are incapable of defending the exposure of the private elements of their lives from the public. Id. at 56. In order to make her
argument, Roth relies upon Weber’s definition of power as “the probability that one actor
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Id. at 47 (quoting MAX
WEBER, The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, in MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 87, 152 (Talcott Parson ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott
Parson trans., 1947)). Moreover, the power that determines the placement of the discursive boundary between public and private is a “a structural power held by certain more
powerful collectivities and their members, in relation to less powerful ones, which is
intentional, impositional, and latent when not being exercised.” Id. at 48. While not
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exit from the Medicaid device that demands the evacuation of the pregnant
woman’s rights.
CONCLUSION
Through the examination of women’s interaction with the PCAP apparatus, this Article has argued that indigent families are made public upon
their receipt of state assistance; further it has explored why it is that indigent
women and families fail to enjoy a presumption of privacy with regard to
matters that have been discursively constructed as private. This exploration
suggests that poverty, as constructed within our present sociopolitical location, is believed to index a lack of moral integrity—a lack that, in turn,
justifies the erasure of the line that is imagined to separate private conduct
from public intervention. The exploration leads to the possibility that, perhaps, the poor barter their privacy rights in exchange for government assistance. Yet, the ease with which the poor barter their rights suggests that it
may be more accurate to describe the poor as never having rights to begin
with. Indeed, a more honest description may entail admitting that, in our
particular sociopolitical location, wealth is a condition of possibility for
rights.
That wealth is a condition of possibility for rights would help to explain
the generally dismal state of poor women’s privacy rights/liberty interests in
the U.S insofar as the Supreme Court has determined that a poor woman’s
right to privacy/liberty interests does not impose any duty upon the state to
help her pay the cost of an abortion.193 When one considers that the right to
privacy for non-poor women enables their access to abortion services, while
the “right” to privacy for poor women dismally fails to accomplish the same
feat, can we still argue that non-poor women and poor women possess the
same right? We are confronted with a situation wherein the right to privacy
for poor women is without content and without effect. Again, is a right that
is devoid of substance a right at all? The Supreme Court has similarly held
that the right to privacy possessed by a poor woman does not impose upon
the state the obligation to provide even those abortions that would save her
from being maimed.194 Simply stated, the right to privacy possessed by the
intending to argue that Weberian power can be reduced to Marxist class, I do not think it
inaccurate, in the least, to claim that that which determines the inability of the Alpha
patient to defend elements of her life that have been discursively constructed as private
from public exposure is her lack of power derived from her subordinate class position.
When rights are understood as the stuff through which persons defend private elements of
their lives, then the inability of that defense can be understood as the absence of the right.
Id.
193
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (holding that “[t]he Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents,” and, therefore,
that a State had no obligation to fund “nontherapeutic” abortions for indigent women).
194
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1980) (noting that because “a woman’s
freedom of choice” does not carry with it “a constitutional entitlement to the financial

\\server05\productn\H\HLG\34-1\HLG104.txt

174

unknown

Seq: 62

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

1-FEB-11

10:39

[Vol. 34

poor woman is so impoverished of value and consequence that it can not
even protect her physical health. Once again, do we overstate that about
which we speak when we call this a “right”? Further, the insignificance of
the “rights” possessed by the poor is not particular to the right to privacy;
the Supreme Court has similarly held that poor people’s “rights” do not entitle them to shelter195 or other life-sustaining services.196
It deserves underscoring that my argument is not about the impoverishment of rights discourse. My claim is not that, at this time, rights are formulated as rights against government interference when what is needed are
rights to some conception of liberty. While a reformulation of rights as imposing an affirmative duty on the state, rather than an interdiction upon state
action—that is, a conversion of rights to “rights to” rather than “rights
against” —would be a dramatic improvement to the present state of rights
within the U.S., this transformation within rights discourse may not adequately resolve the dilemma at hand. That is, even if rights were conceptualized and enforced as rights to some conception of liberty, the poor may still
find themselves without these new rights to positive government action. Is
there reason to believe that “rights to” would not still remain a function of
class? There is a danger that the poor would, in spite of a revolutionary
reformulation of rights, find themselves in the same predicament in which
they now find themselves: possessing “rights” without substance, meaning,
or effect.

resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices,” a State is under no
obligation to fund abortions that are “medically necessary” for indigent women).
195
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding that no obligation exists for
the government to provide adequate housing).
196
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (observing that “[a]s a general
matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those
within its border”).

